

**A PHENOMENOLOGY OF DISCRIMINATION THAT APPEARS TO
BE BASED ON THE MEANING WE ASCRIBE TO SKIN COLOUR**

BY

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS:

Black - reflects skin colour as determined by the client

'Race' - neologism that reflects attempts to categorise individuals/groups based on biological determinants such as skin colour, physical features, and in some cases, language

Racism – consists of conduct, words, or practices which advantage or disadvantage people because of their skin colour, culture, ethnic origin, and may be subtle or overt.

Institutional Racism – consists of collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate, and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, and/or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes, and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.

Culture - set of social values/beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour which seem to be characteristic of a particular group of people, and which show intergenerational stability, overtime

Ethnicity - a group that seems to adhere to a distinct socio-cultural, customs, way of life, and/or religious features, in comparison with the wider society in which this group chooses to live

Dissociation - apparent 'separating-out' of some aspect of our being that holds negative meanings for us in-relation to others

Abstract:

The concept of “social exclusion” may be used to describe the experiences of those people who feel that they do not belong to mainstream society. This sense of belonging may be considered to be important within any social grouping as it seems to provide the means by which individual affirm and confirm each other in positive ways Buber (1966) describes ways of being which seem to important in the development of this sense of belonging; of being-there or ‘Da-sein’ in-relation with others. By application it could be argued that being-there as a Black man in-relation to those who perceive themselves as being ‘Not-Black’ within any given society would require two movements. The first being one where the Black man is set a part as being ‘different’, and not-White, and the second where the Black man is made ‘independent’ in spite of this difference through the process of genuine dialogue. The two need not presuppose the existence of the other, nor present as prerequisite for the existence of the other, but they must both be present according to Buber.

The experience of social exclusion seems to present a situation within which a person or group of people is set apart but they are not made independent through the process of genuine dialogue. Much seems to take place that remains unsaid, and based on what is said, and the inferences derived from what is sensed, seem to bare little truth in-relation to the object of the individual’s/groups attention. that ‘sets people a part without making them independent’ (Buber, 1966). We selectively respond to those who present with particular defining features without evaluating the possibility that the values, and other sedimentations, that underpin such behaviour may not be valid within the context in which that we find ourselves.

Discrimination against Black men ‘separates out’ people of a particular colour and gender without making them independent. It is a social phenomenon of importance, historically. For centuries, the Western world appears to have viewed Black men more for their ‘functional’ value, as opposed to their more ‘aesthetic’ value. This seemed to pose little problem early on in human history, however, inter-racial dialogue today continues to be restricted to the sphere of work, and employment. Divergence of inter-racial dialogue into other social sub-dimensions such as school, marriage, and the family, has furthered the movement toward greater inter-racial intersubjectivity by the sharing of cultural information. However, with advances in technology, and the demise of the manufacturing industries since the 1970’s, and amidst greater competition for fewer jobs, the non-Black people of the dominant culture within the Western world have begun to even question the Black Man’s functional value in-relation to themselves.

It could be argued that ‘social exclusion’ is more of a consequence, rather than the purpose, of discrimination, in general. But it might be better argued that if, our actions in the world are more often than not intentional, then discriminatory behaviour that results in the experience of what could be described as ‘social exclusion’ must also be considered to be intentional; if, not purposeful. Shedding some light on this phenomenon may elucidate reasons for its continuance, overtime, and throw-up ways of helping people of colour construct a sense of identity that does not appear to be distorted by de-valuing statements about their character that do not appear not grounded in ‘evidence’.

Phenomenology as a Method of Research

The term phenomenology may be defined as the 'study of appearances'. It is a method research, which aims to discover 'how' things appears to the researcher/observer. Husserl (1923) suggested that phenomenology starts with what appears, what is sensed, and ends with verbalised thought, (e.g. naming, describing, and categorisation) of what appears to establish relations between meaning within given contexts. The aim is to establish the pre-requisites for any lived experience to occur. This in-itself seems to require *a priori*; some prior knowledge of what goes to make-up an object/subject what it appears to be. (Assuming that the object//subject of our intention is made-up of it's component parts: that is the object of our intention seems to made up of something). For this to occur, the researcher is required to set aside any presumptions s/he may have in-relation to the object/subject, and to direct his/her embodied consciousness towards the object of his/her intention. In this sense, the directedness of the act of looking seems, purposefully. However, what is discovered remains to be discovered anew. What makes up its component parts, the defining features of the object/subject of the researchers directed attention?

Husserl (1977) suggests that both what is, and what is not, ready-to-hand, as a construct of our embodied consciousness is worthy of investigation, and that it is out of this that we are able to derive understanding. This method relies on the accurate description of what is sensed, what appears to us through our diligence and application, before any attempt to manipulate any aspect of what has materialised for us can begin. Hence, scientific investigation can not begin until the researcher has described the object/subject to be manipulated s it appears to him/her at the moment in time and space. This I feel is an important aspect of any investigation. In particular, what is a skin colour, how does it reveal itself to us, and how do we establish relations between the meanings of what is revealed within a given context, and what is revealed as consequence of the intersubjective? The method can be outline as follows taken from:

Step 1. The *psychological epoche*, requires that we set aside any prior judgements as to what the object/subject of our intention may be until the said has revealed itself to us. We remain in the world, and involved with others, and the object, but reflect on our subjective awareness about the object of our intention. We treat the object as if we had never seen it before, and reflect on our experience of it as newly discovered.

Step 2. Attempt to accurately describe the object of your intention as it appears to you. This does not involve interpretation. Try not to add, subtract, distort, generalise, theorise, explain, jump to conclusions, nor repeat conventional wisdom about the object/subject of you intention.

Step 3. Try to envisage the possibilities of what appears to ascertain what the object/subject of your intention is, and what it is not. This facilitates to move towards an *eidetic reduction* of what has appeared to you on reflection. By this it seems that the relation between what has been revealed maybe established on reflection and we are then able to 'name/categorise' what has been revealed against a horizon of what it is not.

Step 4. This final action involves a *transcendental epoche*. By this I mean that we attempt to dissociate what is one's own everyday beliefs and assumptions about what might be possible, and hence what goes beyond what appears to be immanent. This means that the transcendent is disqualified within everyday experience. This enables the researcher's findings to be compared with other researcher experiences of the same object/subject utilising the same method.

(Owen, 1994)

This method sounds good, insomuch, as the researcher is required to set aside their own prior judgements whether they be immanent or transcendent, and to describe the object/subject of their intentional discovery as it appears to him/her at a given time and space. But out of what do we create experience that is sense? How do we make sense of our sensations? Of what are the objects/subjects of our intention made-up? How do we discern what these components parts are? It seems to me that after much deliberation and eidetic reduction there would be nothing left, and how do you describe nothing? To illustrate, consider that we are observing the straight-edged object, below:

Fig.1



We note that it has four straight-edges, and four corners, and that the edges seem to be related to each other such that the straight edge and corners form a continuous alignment with each other and are connected. Further, eidetic reduction would result in the de-construction of the object of our intention into its apparent constituent parts, and it would cease to be a straight-edged object connected at its corners in a continuous line. This seems important with respect to the identification of the person skin colour. Having deconstructed the physicality of the person to a skin colour, against a background that does not seem to part of the same object/subject, the object/subject of our intention has been reduced to ‘an **object**’ which has no meaning other than what we choose to attach to it. In itself, the object as skin colour has no other meaning than that – a skin colour. The **person** enwrapped in this skin colour remains undiscovered; until, such time as we chose to enter into genuine dialogue with that person; until we enter into the intersubjective.

It seems to me that, just as inanimate objects appear to be made-up of constituent parts, or defining parts, so too, are people. Black men seem to be made up of defining features of which skin colour is only one. In-itself, this skin colour remains meaningless beyond the statement of factual existence for us as individuals. However, invoking the possibilities, (i.e. the transcendent), as to what a person possessing this skin colour could be observed doing beyond the immanent, seems to remain purely that – a figment of our imagination. This leads me to question as to where the information pertaining to the component parts, or defining features, of ‘the Black man’ originate from? From where does these ‘facts’ reveal themselves?

Clearly, the component parts of the straight-edged figure above, is recognised as such because of the discovery of the straight-edges, and their connectedness. Even with out prior knowledge of ‘the straight-edged figure’, we seem to have some idea as to what it means to be straight-edged, and what it means to be connected. Further, eidetic reduction might reveal that the straight-edges are finite in length thus giving the overall shape a composite shape and size - its configuration. Against an horizon of the page on which the object appears to have been constructed appears to give the shape clear boundaries, and we are able to ascertain where the straight-edges begin, and where they end. In the same way, a skin colour seems to reveal the object of its possessor as being a particular shape against a background that seems unrelated to skin colour, itself. The observer ascertains that the skin colour itself means nothing more than its own immanent qualities, but beyond this, there appears to be nothing else to become ‘known’ about the skin colour remains a mystery without invoking the transcendent. The object, (i.e. the skin colour), has definition; we can ascertain that it does not belong to us, and that it belongs to someone in particular. This seems to be the extent of that which seems immanent; and yet, we seem to be able to invoke the transcendent, and conjure-up for ourselves the possibilities of what this skin colour is capable of doing. In-itself, the skin colour does not appear to be capable of doing

anything. We make the movement from the “thing” to the “thing doing”, and this seems to be an important movement.

We must, therefore, put skin colour in its proper place, (i.e. that of symbol), about which we seem to conjure-up for ourselves our own meaning out of a range of possible views and opinions about what this inanimate object may, and may not, be. In-itself it is nothing more than it is; it does nothing: nothing more seems to reveal itself against an horizon that appears to be the world-around.

If, we give this skin colour movement, and direct our attention such that the skin colour appears to be seen *doing something*, our attention becomes directed towards that which gives this skin colour movement – the person who owns the skin colour. The Skin colour, now, has form, and function, which reveal themselves through our observations. But the person has not yet revealed themselves to us; and yet, in situations where we separate-out the person of colour without making him/her independent, we seem to behave as, if, s/he has been revealed to us a some point in time and place in history. We believe that s/he has presented to us something of themselves about which we wish to distance ourselves in one way or another. Feelings of disgust well up, emotively, and to avoid their persistence over time and place, we attempt to change the range of possible sensations without considering the possibility that our perceptions in that time and place may not be as accurate as we might like them to be (Husserl, 1918/1960).. But this in-itself poses yet another question. Do we wait until the object of our disgust/fear, and perceived threat, becomes precisely that? At what time do we begin to defend ourselves and preserve ourselves in-relation with the perceived threat? Do we wait, and possibly cease to exist for the other? How long do we wait and verify our perceptions in-relation before taking defensive steps to avoid annihilation in-relation with others?

In the first instance, it would seem that assuming such a position in the face of immanent danger would seem foolhardy. In the recent episodes of what were found to be racially motivated crimes against Black men, (e.g. Stephen Lawrence), their apparent setting aside of their own preconceptions may have resulted in their own deaths. At what point do you decide that real danger is immanent, and not just present-to-hand. In-relation with the other, we must decide on the information that is made available to us about how to be in-relation with our lived-world. Waiting to test our assumptions may be tempting fate just too much, but at that time, and before any the crime has been experienced, we have no idea what will transpire until after the event. The dilemma reveals itself, and we are left pondering how best to proceed. If, we proceed, phenomenologically, we may not live to experience the outcome of our intentions, purposeful or otherwise; and yet, if we proceed, scientifically, we may at least be able to ascertain the intentions of others without waiting for them to reveal themselves. This for me, leads to question empiricism in-itself. All-things-considered, it would seem that we must say something about that which appears to be immanent before we consider ‘what’ it is we intend to manipulate in the transcendent. This would enable us to describe the object, (e.g. skin colour), before determining something about the object’s subjectivity, (i.e. what the skin colour may observed, doing). To presume the object’s subjectivity without first finding out something about the qualities of object itself, seems to me like badly done science; rather than problem of empiricism, itself, (i.e. ‘man as scientist’ at his worst).

Problem of Empiricism? Or, Just Badly Done Science?

Within Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, Meno's Paradox seems to have been addressed. The great French Existential-Phenomenologist, and Ontologist, argued that, 'Empiricism (Science) cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for it; and that, 'Intellectualism (rationalism) fails to see that we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, or equally again, we would not be searching'. However, I am not entirely convinced that the latter of these two propositions is, necessarily, the case. This latter statement suggests that the process of 'looking for something' does not require the observer to demonstrate intentionality in the act of looking, in-itself. Further, this latter statement defies the 'Verification Principle,' which states that: 'a statement is factual, and hence meaningful, only if sense experience can go at least some way to confirming it'. Therefore, the intentional act of looking; in either this way or that, allows for the process to become both factual and meaningful because sense experience relates the act of our intention, (i.e. looking), with the object/subject of our intention. Hence, the act of looking becomes not only intentional, but also, purposeful, (i.e. it becomes meaningful). In addition, anyone calling into existence an object/subject of his experience must know under what conditions he calls it 'true', and subsequently under what condition he calls it 'false'. Failing to say something about the conditions in which the sense experience is to be validated casts doubt as to whether the sense experience is known, and knowable; and hence, seems devoid of meaning (Davies, 1993). However, it is accepted that even when we do not know what we are looking, we cannot say that we know that the object or subject of our intention does not exist, nor that it could not exist.

If, I am looking, (i.e. simply staring out into space), I become aware of both, apparently stagnant, and moving things, which can be represented, internally, against a background or horizon in which the objects/subjects of my intention are to be found. If, I were ignorant of what I was looking for I would not know that I had found it, rationally, or empirically, as I have not stated what it is that I had been looking for, in the first instance. But the searching in-itself, would not stop me from discovering something new, or different, from what appears to be familiar to my senses; elucidated at the points where what is known to me becomes unclear. I may not know what I have found in the totality of its configuration, but I may know something about its configuration in that what is known seems to give me clues as to what it is that I have perceived in totality, intellectually. In which case, I may be able to ascertain the object/subject of my intention's true nature, empirically, by applying what I believe to be true about the object/subject of my intention's component parts. Hence, Descartes instigation of the 'Mind-Body duality', and the separation of the human person into its components parts to ascertain the human person in its totality seems to be bare witness to the possibility of uncovering the truth about being-there in part; if, not in totality.

Ontologically, I seem to be aware of those objects that have movement, in relation to, and with, my own lived-body, much more so, than those objects which do not appear to move at all. I may not be looking for anything, in particular; but I recognise some aspects relative to those that I do not. I am simply observing the world-around in-relation to myself. I may take stock of my own body, or that within which I am embodied, and in so doing, ascertain what I may, or may not, do with my body given

some evaluation of the prevailing circumstances, and my body's relation to these circumstances in the world-around. I become more aware of the limitations, and possibilities, of my own embodiment in ways that seem particular to me in that time and place. Still I am not looking for anything, in particular. I believe I 'know' what I have sensed inasmuch as I sense with intention that is specific. As yet there is no purpose to my sensing - only being in the moment.

In perceiving, I have shown intention that is specific. In interpretation, I have shown intention that is specific. The world does not reveal itself to me; it appears, as I would have it appear to me. There is both intention, and direction, in my perception and interpretation, ontologically. I conjure-up for myself, the world-around for me, and the world becomes in-itself-for-me. Through Sartrean 'veils', it, the object to my attention, appears as of any hue I choose for myself. Collectively, the world reveals itself in ways, which appear to be similar for others. By this, I mean that in genuine dialogue with others, other's perception of aspects of their lived-world may show a high correlation to my own, and 'we' seem to be choosing to perceive the lived-world in much the same way as each other. Through empirical investigation, we may imagine that our own sense experience is a 'true' representation of our own experience; inasmuch, as others appear to perceive the world in much the same ways as we do. But does this make our perceptions and interpretations any the more valid, and hence, more meaningful?

In discovering the world-around, the empiricist declares 'that art thou'. The object/subject of investigation appears to be compiled of a number of attributes, or component parts, which the empiricist believes are commensurate with, or not with, a particular object. The more attributes the empiricist discovers for him or herself, the more the empiricist is likely to believe that s/he has found what s/he has been looking for. This assumes that the empiricist, already, knows something about what it is s/he has been looking for. S/he will recognise certain aspects of the object that s/he attends to, (i.e. the objective), and labels them accordingly as being either this, or that, (i.e. the subjective). This, for Merleau-Ponty, becomes the 'object', and 'object' experienced as doing either this, or that, becomes 'the subject' - the process of 'subject-object dialogue'. The empiricist may not recognise other aspects of the configuration in which the identified objects show relation, but in discovering anew that which/she had believed to be true, the empiricist is confronted with the opportunity to say something else about what s/he already believes to be 'true'. In this sense, Meno is right to question whether it is possible to look for something when you don't in the least know what it is we are looking for. Science indeed, would become a pointless exercise, if, this was indeed science. But we don't look for what we already have no knowledge of, *per se*? We sense, and certain aspects of the world-around that come into view, are recognised from our experiences; whilst others, appear lost to us, or unclear. Do we not compare what we find, (i.e. the immanent), with what we might possibly find, (i.e. the transcendent)? We compare what we have found with what would imagine we might find as "objects of intention by reason".

It may well be that there are aspects of the world-around that we do not recognise. Our curiosity engages our semantic memory for similarities between the object of our attention, and prior experience of 'it' and what 'it' is believed to be 'doing'. We may transcend our own experience by attempting to put components of our new experiences together in ways, which we believe should be

possible. In this way, we construct a sense of the world-around that contains components of what we believe to be possible. Therefore, it is not that we look for something without knowing what it is; it is more that we look for things that we think might be, and conclude that we have found something by sense experience. Hence, the immanent, and the transcendent, become the same thing. By this I mean, the way we experience the world as one that seems to be put together within our own minds in ways which may be similar in-relation to others from an empirical perspective, but also in ways that may be very different from an intellectual perspective. All knowledge seems to require an ability to indulge the imagination to look for things that might, and represent what is found as a consolation of what seems both immanent, and transcendent.

We are not able to exclude the 'familiar' from the 'unfamiliar' without knowing something about what constitutes the 'familiar'. We note that there is something about the 'thing-doing' (or the subjective) that seems different from our prior experience of the 'thing-doing'. In other words, we sense that at the 'edges' of the object/subject of our intention, there appears to be a difference from what we believe is 'true' about the object/subject of our intention, and what we do not. We are uncertain. We acknowledge the possibility of constructing the world-around within our own minds in ways, which seem different, perceptually, by discerning what might, and what might not, possibly be true about the objects/subjects of our intention. We say that where others, also, share this experience, the possibility of what might be, and what might not be true, approaches certainty.

For instance, we get up each morning, our bedrooms seem familiar, or not as the case may be; and we initiate actions in familiar ways in-relation to what we believe to be true about the prevailing situation. We may find that there is a shoe in our path on the way to the bathroom. It is a familiar shoe' inasmuch, as we recognise the shoe; but, its position in space and time, prove to be unfamiliar. We may stumble on the way to the bathroom. We 'throw' ourselves into a place of uncertainty. We are unsure as to correct procedure for going to the bathroom, momentarily. We might turn, and 'kick' the shoe out of the way, check our bearings; that everything else appears to be where they are supposed to be, (i.e. in their familiar position roundabout), before proceeding on the bathroom. We bring to bear all our preconceptions about the experience/procedure of going to the bathroom, and what might be expected, to bear on the situation. The limitations within which this experience might occur have been pre-set.

We might look for reasons to explain why our experience at that time and place appear to be outside of the possibilities and limitations of our expectations. We may criticise the dog, or the children, as we continue on our journey. We may search for reasons as to 'why' this shoe had materialised for us at the time and place that it had. We have, already, decided that fault for our experience lies outside of our own range of possible ways for being-in-the-world as we are certain that we ourselves would not have left the shoe in a place where the possibility of us tripping over it remain very high. By this I mean, that we cannot remember leaving the shoe where we had left it the night before, (i.e. immanent), and that this would not normally be a place for us to leave the shoe, (i.e. the transcendent); therefore, we conclude that somebody, or something else, had left the shoe where you found that morning. We might even consider the intentionality of the act, and indeed, whether the act was purposeful. We are certain in that our ontological experience has put the world together in this way. What could this event possibly mean?

In the first instance, I had nearly tripped and hurt myself due to the shoe that was lying in the hallway in a place that it should not have been. Shoes should not be in the hallway, I should not trip over shoes that have been left in the hallway, and I should not trip over something that should not have been in the place it was at that time of the day. Shoes do not lie around in hallways of their own accord, unattended. Already, I am looking for something/someone to blame for my mishap, and that someone is not likely to be me. This scenario reflects Descartes' philosophy, in so much as empiricism begins with a split between subject, and object. The totality of the experience (subject), has been broken down into its component parts (objects), as if by 'magic'. I have, already, reduced the experience of 'going to the bathroom' into its component parts, the shoe, the hallway, the bathroom, etc, and shown how they relate to each other within the scenario/event that appears as my experience. I have even transcended my experience at that time, by conjuring-up possible reasons for the shoe being-there in the first place. I had brought into play objects that could have influenced my interpretation of events; though I had little 'evidence' to support any of it. The question remains 'how does the subject, (i.e. the person), come to know objects, (i.e. the component parts of an event/situation), without prior experience of some part of the event/situation?' Do we not discover things in a context, as something in amongst other things – in-relation to, and/or with, the world-around.

Merleau-Ponty argues that the assumption of empiricism is due to the "experience error." The "experience error" is the error of attributing to a phenomenon what 'a priori' precepts dictate should be found in it. But this in-itself is not empiricism. Empiricism does not allow for the imagination as an aide for discovery beyond statements about what might, and might not be, outside of human experience at that time and place. Empiricism does not suggest that we 'fill in the blanks' when that within which we are embodied suggests that we should be experiencing more than we can sense at a given time-space continuum. Empiricism that does invite the 'experience error', (e.g. inasmuch as the activity does seem to view the phenomenon as always 'hard-edged and determinate' at its edges), and seems to do no more so, than the phenomenology. Even the intellectualist's experiences have limitations by virtue of the number of valid reasons that can be brought to bear on their projects in the world.

Experience then, too, seems hard-edged, and determinate, at any given time. We do not expect to find more than what we believe defines the object-subject in context. We appear to sense within fixed parameters, and deny the existence of other possible configurations of experiencing the object-subject in context. In this sense the immanent, and the transcendental seem to become indistinguishable. But sometimes we are surprised: we may sense more than we expect. It is not denied that we, often, transcend what is experienced within the context of our everyday lives, and that this seems to be a possibility which carries within it its own limitations. However, in so doing, we are not conducting empirical research. Scientific research seems to require that within what we believe to be true about the object of our intention, and the context in which this object may be found, we hope to discover something different about the object/subject of our intention by indulging the transcendent. We consider possible explanations for what the object may be observed 'doing' in-relation within a given context, (i.e. under specific conditions), by exploring "the thing, and the thing doing within a given context". We hope to prove, or disprove our hypotheses; possibilities as yet, outside of our

everyday experiences; by looking for what appears to be 'different' about the way the object-subject appears to be within a given context. And sometimes we may be surprised by what we discover.

Our investigation into the subject of our intention carries with it its own possibilities, and limitations. What Heidegger would call the "ready-to-hand" is uncertain only at its edges. 'Object-Subject in context' experience does appear to be 'fuzzy' at its parameters; and not 'hard-edged'. At the point where we realise our own limitations, and hence our own possibilities, we are confronted with uncertainty that seems inevitable. However, we seek to 'fill-in' areas of ambiguity in our everyday experience in ways that support the 'constancy hypothesis'. Merleau-Ponty refers to 'the constancy hypothesis', and seems to be suggesting that: 'for each point on the surface of a stimulus (what is seen), there is a point of stimulation on the retina. This leads to the reduction of the thing, and percept to atomistic elements'. It would seem that we create for ourselves everyday experiences that show a high correlation with our experiences, but this cannot deny the possibility of discovering something different about the object/subject of our intention. This begs the question as to how we could ever experience something anew, and as being different. If everything shows dynamism in relation such that nothing is 'fixed, determinate and hard-edged', does not the world then become unknowable outside of human existence. In the end, what we are left with is an inability to solve Meno's paradox. If the world is unknowable, how will we know we've discovered something that is true?

Rationalism, like empiricism, is also rooted in the tradition of Descartes. It, also, understands truth as certainty, and begins with a split between subject, and object. An analogy may be made between the concepts of immanence, and transcendence. Within these same assumptions, however, it takes an opposite stance from empiricism. While empiricism claims that all knowledge of the world comes from experience, rationalism holds that all knowledge is 'a priori', (i.e. already known by the subject prior to experience). The mind organises or constitutes the things in experience, and we can never know the thing-in-itself outside of experience (Kant is a good example of this perspective). For Kant, we can never know a thing-in-itself until it has revealed itself to us. The mind is an active originator of experience rather than a passive recipient of perception. If, perceptual experience is processed, how valid is our perception? It seems to me that we, already, know something about the thing-in-itself, as we would not be able to say what the thing-in-itself is not. Hence, if we did not know what we were looking for in the first place we would not know that we had found it. At its edges, there is revealed points of uncertainty, areas of fuzziness about which the object/subject of our intention presents less clarity. We attempt to ascertain the validity of our sense experience by considering the possibilities. We may not know that the totality of our experience, as this in-itself would require that the experience has no 'fuzzy' edges. As a probability, we can say something about its component parts, and as they in turn appear to have been assembled, everything must be considered to be a product of our imagination – a possibility.

Knowledge in-itself, becomes the outcome of an intersubjective exercise – a fantasy. We do not know about things-in-themselves apart from our perception of them. For Kant, perception is a **synthesis**. Perception requires that we take appearances, and correlate these with previous experience, and the experiences of others. We apply reason to what we believe to be true about the world-around; its possibilities, and its limitations. Again this requires prior knowledge of the world; form and

function; but this need not be total in its perception. Discovery then seems to require partial knowledge of the object of our intention. We know what we are looking, and sometimes we discover more or less than we expected. Physical sensation gives rise to an application of reason to experience results in the perception of phenomenal objects in context. This in-itself, tends to a rational science out of **transcendental deduction**. To illustrate, in observing that my foot has hit something on the floor. I look down, and identify the object as a shoe. I notice that it is shaped like a shoe. It is hard to the touch. It is made of what appears to be leather; there are laces. To all intents and purposes, the reasons for my concluding that this is a shoe, are 'good enough'. The **evidence** that I have collected supports the view that it is a shoe. At the edges of this object, there is a background space, or horizon, that has depth. I am not able to say with any great certainty what occupies this space as my attention is focused on the shoe; the shoe being the source of my immediate discomfort. At the edges of my experience, there is uncertainty. We cannot postulate the question, as did Meno, as it is not possible to look for something without knowing for what we are searching. Intention is implicit with the 'doing' word – to search. We can discover something that we had not been searching for in so much as it is not what we expected to find in the first place. Hence, if I already know what I am seeking to discover, why bother searching if my intention is not to make use of it? For me, this is a nonsense question; and philosophy, as well as the sciences, would indeed, be a pointless endeavour.

Do we search for possibilities, and discover anew the limitations of what we already believe to be 'true'. But we can be 'surprised' in our search for the 'truth'. We can come across a configuration of experience that in its totality appears to us, unfamiliar. We can set aside what we recognise as being familiar, and attend to the bigger picture which includes experiences which are not familiar, and which are given meaning by virtue of the ways in which the familiar is in relation to, and with, the unfamiliar aspects of the total experience. Out of this we create for ourselves hypotheses; assumptions; postulates, which attempt to explain how we might appear to be in-relation at some point in the future, with what we already believe to be 'true' in the here-and-now. We, as Merleau-Ponty says, give primacy to perception. But perception does not appear to precede scientific investigation. We establish our relation with the world-around through our 'lived body'. All of our senses are brought to bear on the subject of our investigation. We withhold judgement; until, such time as we are able to say something about what the subject of our investigation is by virtue of what it is not. All aspects of our investigation are given equal importance, though primacy may be given to some aspect of our experience that fascinates us, or holds our curiosity the most. At the edges, the subject remains 'fuzzy'. Uncertainty sets in, and we impose limitations, and hence possibilities, to the experience at hand, and do so in accordance with what our lived bodies believe might be possible.

Merleau-Ponty talked of the body as "flesh," made of the same flesh of the world, and it is because the flesh of the body is of the flesh of the world, that we can know and understand the world. To demonstrate this concept of the lived body, Merleau-Ponty uses the example of 'the phantom limb'. A phantom limb would not be possible, if, our bodies were just machines. If, a part of the machine were severed from the rest of the machine, it would simply go without using the limb. Yet, people who have a limb amputated still 'feel' the limb, and they are still 'called' to use the limb in situations that call for its use; even though it is no longer there. In this same sense, the whole-lived body is an

intentional body, which is lived through in relation to its possibilities in the world. Even when the limb is gone, 'the possibilities for its use remain, but are unable to be taken up as a project in the world'. But these are not possibilities for its use, for the limb does not exist as part of the lived-body. It only exists as part of the imagination: a phantom limb. By transcendental deduction, we imagine its possibilities and limitations as having experienced them as such for oneself. It is, now, outside of human experience, and its existence appears to fade, overtime, as we come to realise that in reality it does not exist in-itself-for-us, nor any body else for that matter.

The idea of the lived body does not allow Merleau-Ponty to resolve Meno's paradox. The lived-body does appear to be both transcendent, and immanent both at the same time. However, this is a little different from Descartes Mind-body duality. We have a subject-object dichotomy; and yet, ask how we can be both the 'same', and 'different' at the same time. Things outside of our everyday experiences do not exist for us; except in the transcendent or what we might believe might be possible. We might believe that they exist in themselves, for themselves, and support such views with 'evidence' or 'reasons', but these things do not exist for us in the here-and-now as **sense experiences**. This does not mean that we need evidence or reasons to establish a belief or value as being valid, and hence meaningful. We can always sense something, and then pretend that it does not exist for us in the here-and-now, at all. We can never, physically, enter into dialogue with something or someone that does not exist beyond physical sensation without first considering the possibilities and limitations of so doing.

The object/subject may exist in-itself-for-itself, but it not exist for me in any tangible way. The thing exists "in-itself" because I resist my knowing it with in any real sense. The thing exists as a construct of my imagination; I have assigned certain properties, which are not subject to challenged until I chose to share these products of my intellectualism with the object of their ascription. However, the thing exists "for me" because I always experience it in-relation to my own body. It is sensed as being, and allowing me to do, something. A bed, for example, is something to lie on which I can place my body. A table is something to sit at, and eat at. Things allow for certain bodily engagements while closing-off, others. Our intentionality, therefore, has limitations and possibilities that may not reveal themselves until after the fact, or sensed experience. In this sense, to make the distinction between the transcendent, and the immanent seems pointless, as they, both appear to be indicative of the possibilities of our intentions and as such, products of our imagination. Things may present for possibilities which seem both **immanent**, (i.e. possible, now), and **transcendent**, (i.e. possible at some point in the future; in so much, as things that appear to be given to experience, appear to be "in-themselves-for-me" only as a consequence of the lived-body. If, we did not indulge the imagination, science would be a pointless venture, and phenomenology would be impossible.

If, we can understand this idea of the "in-itself-for-me," we can see how experience as it is given to us is always a subject-object dialogue. I can never experience things independent of my experience as a bodily engaged being in the world; the meaning I bring to my perception is a perceiving which is embodied. It is by virtue of my embodiment that I can experience things as being up or down, as having insides or outsides, as being close or far away. Space is always in-relation to my body as situated within the world, or being-there. The same may be true of time. I am always situated in the present, on the way somewhere, or as having been somewhere. Thus, experience is always in the

process of becoming, or coming into focus. Just when I am aware of things as 'fixed, rigid, determinate, unchangeable, tangible, they become, indeterminate, fuzzy at the edges' and ambiguous.

According to Merleau-Ponty, we know when we have found what we are looking for because the world is already pregnant with meaning in relation to the lived-body. Things begin as ambiguous, but become more determinate as I become bodily engaged with them, or turn my attention to them. I do not already know what I am looking for because at its edges, there are always something about which I am uncertain. Things come into view; we focus, and in so doing, things become 'real' for us. But how can they become real for us, if, we know nothing about the object-subject in context of our intention?

Merleau-Ponty, also, makes a distinction between the pre-reflective, and the reflective. When we reflect on experience, what we reflect on becomes hard-edged and determinate, (i.e. as having definite dimensions, and specific meanings). This reflected experience could be determinate and hard-edged only in-relation with indeterminate, ambiguous horizons or backgrounds. Experience is then built upon an original, pre-reflective, ambiguous ground that is the world-horizon. Experience begins in the pre-reflective, and reflection is always an abstract derivative of this primordial, pre-reflective, lived experience: the ready-to-hand. Reflection is not like the map compared to the un-reflected country-side as it is not possible to perceive 'the country side' as being 'the country side' without knowing something about what makes up the component parts of 'the country side'. Does this not sound like transcendental deduction? We sense, apply what we believe to be true, and denote difference in what has been induced, to arrive at something that has been deduced from what has already been perceived.

In this sense, we become aware of ambiguity in-relation to ambiguity. Induction provides the data out of which we create for ourselves something that is deduced: you cannot have one without the other. In the same ways, the horizon at which point defining features fade into obscurity, and uncertainty demands a revision of what we believe to be true about what we perceive, the reductionist is invoked, and the empiricist is called to bare witness to his/her incantations. This is possible because what is induced it, also, create for ourselves: deduction makes what is perceived 'real' for us. We sense with all that we are, (i.e. lived body), but we do not sense everything at once. This seems to confuse the senses, and overload the neural networks. Instead, we take little bits at a time, and put together the 'patchwork quilt' in the hope that the finished article is 'true' representation of the subject of our attention. That beyond the horizon swings into view bit by bit; not all at once. This in-itself leaves room for error; the 'experience error' as Merleau-Ponty puts it, but how do we know that we have made 'an experience error', when on reflection we are unable to give good-enough reason for what we have discovered to have occurred in the way that it had?

We cannot search for something that we don't know exists. That would be like looking for nothing. What are we looking for, exactly? It is possible to find something that we had not expected to encounter in our searching, but this can only be described in-relation to what you already believe to be 'true' about being-in-the-world, and there is no certainty in that beyond the sensed experience. In discovering something anew, we have already told ourselves that what has been discovered appears to be, significantly, different from what we had previously believed to be 'true' about being-in-the-world. We can conjure-up for ourselves limitations, and possibilities, but not without some reference to what we already believe to be true about being in the world. Hence, 'transcendental deduction' relates what

we already believe to be true with what might be possible, and this is empiricism as a phenomenological exercise. Empiricism is not supposed to prove what we already believe to be true, but to discover anew these facts, whilst at the same time being prepared to be 'surprised'.

So, I make no distinction between science, and phenomenology, save to say that there is good science as much as there appears to be not so good, phenomenology. In writing, the researcher presents a point of view. In science, the researcher claims that the findings are common-to-all: in cognitive science, the researcher claims that the findings show consistency of behaviour within, and between groups of people observed doing the same task within a given context/situation. In Cognitive Psychology, the researcher makes claims that there is consistency behaviour between different variables within a 'case study experiment' where the client presents with a common complaint (Kirk, 1997). Such conclusions could be reached in phenomenology, but the researcher chooses not to make such claims. In all cases, the researcher presents a point of view for peer review. The article shows both an objective, and a subjective component. Each component seems meaningless without the others, and as Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre seem to suggest, show both object-subject duality.

Science attempts to minimise the subjective element, whereas phenomenology embraces the subjective. In all cases, the researcher attempts to transcend everyday experience whether this be by setting an objective as in science, or by outlining a topic of investigation, as in phenomenology. By this I mean that, the hypotheses seem indicative of a set of possibilities that may well be outside of lived experience to date, and attempts to show to what extent these ideas might be possible. In phenomenology, the researcher attempts to describe everyday experience, and requires the participant to explore the possibilities and limitations of their own projects in the world; real or imagined. Hence, all information shows validity whether that be scientifically-derived, or phenomenologically-derived. In this vein, I have been selective in choosing the information that I have used to explore the phenomenon/social behaviour, (i.e. discrimination), that appears to be both intentional and purposive. In this way, the information maintains it's relevance to the subject in question on this basis, phenomenologically.

The Movement Towards Social Exclusion

Our skin colour is something that we are given (Fanon, 1952). Our genome when decoded determines for us what our skin colour will become in-relation with our lived-world. From birth, we are 'clothed' in it. It protects from the elements, and enables us to sense the world through the proprioception of heat, and pressure. It helps define our physical form, and shows little significant variation over time; at least, not in the same ways as our height, or hair colour, for instance. Hence, the symbolic representation of skin colour does not show the same 'dynamicity' as the rest of our physical form as suggested by Merleau-Ponty (1968). We are confronted with other people's views and opinions of 'what' it means to be this, or that, skin colour. Skin colour has become a means by which we identify ourselves in-relation to, and with, others. Where there is little variation between people of differing skin colour, other aspects of our being may be brought into being to re-establish 'separateness', individuality, and distinction of one from the other. Individuality and distinctiveness do not appear to be 'bad' or 'wrong' in themselves, but the expression of distinction seems to conjure up all sorts of thoughts and feelings which are not readily understood beyond quantification.

Skin Colour, in-itself, as suggested above, is unlikely to show much variation over time, however, the way we chose to express ourselves, as someone who bares this or that skin colour does seem to vary greatly. We quick of ourselves as possessing this or that skin colour, and create values, or beliefs, which represent within our own minds our understanding of what it means to possess this or that skin colour. Buber (1966) in 'The Knowledge of Man' argues that it is through the process of genuine meeting that we come to 'know' something about what it means to be human. He argues that in turning to the other, the 'primary movement' is to set other a part; to establish functional, and even aesthetic value, in the other, and in so doing, impart on the other, independence: which is the second movement of 'the principle of human life'. However, Buber complains that genuine meeting is a rare occurrence. He comments on moments within the context of his own life when the 'flame that leaps' between one person and the other is extinguished. Seemingly, some forms of dialogue do not seem to support the meeting of one human being with another, and all that is left is the physical self sat or stood in close proximity neither acknowledging the presence of the other. I am reminded of Winnicott's comments on the 'duality of mother/parent and child' in-relation, and wonder 'how' we as humans survive the movement into and out of close proximity. Suddenly, the question as to 'what' extent is the other is made independent in-relation. In the end, we must all assume independence of the other, and it is for good enough parents to show us 'how'.

In observation, most people do seem motivated by a desire to maintain proximity to others; to almost "possess" that which may provide for all their needs. However, the 'principle of human life' does not, necessarily, show full movement as the other is denied independence. Is a baby so dependent on its mother that it has no individuality; no self-concept outside of her/his relationship with his mother? Does the child as s/he grows and develops reproduce this dependent relation; until such time as, s/he meets someone who in turning to him/her does make the developing child independent? The desire to maintain proximity to others may either be something that is learnt, from the point of conception (Trevarthen, 1992); inherent within the human genome; or a combination of the two: the

balance of evidence remains inconclusive. However, history seems to suggest that all behaviour aims to maintain “purposeful proximity” (Bateson, 1972), and deny proximity to that which would refuse, confuse, and/or de-value that ‘essence’ of being that includes the embodiment of the human person (Merleau-Ponty, 1968; Brazelton and Cramer, 1991; Andersen et al, 1997). Hence, the objectification of the other seems inevitable. As Heidegger put it, we are ‘thrown’ into a world in which we seem to be doomed, genetically or otherwise, to enter in-relation within, and between ourselves in ways, which have been cultivated, and reinforced, within the context of our everyday lives, since birth.

‘I-It relationships’ ensure that we will continue to ‘set at a distance’; separate-out; one person from the other, without entering into genuine meeting anything and everything that ceases to hold either aesthetic value, nor functional value for us within the context of our everyday lives. As individuals, make ‘value judgements’ about others based on the meaning attributed to that, which is presented (their defining features). Such sedimentations seem to influence our interaction with others, and with varying effect. Arguably, the Existential concerns of those who do not possess a Black skin colour, may well reflect the Existential concerns of the society as whole: reflecting something that appears to be ‘common to all’. Existential concerns such as isolation, death, meaninglessness, certainly do seem to be common to us all, but Skin Colour carries its own meaning, and transcends time and space. It too does not change with the passage of time and place, and confronts us within the context our everyday lives in ways, which are inescapable. However, we may try to set aside our prejudices, the meaning we attribute to that aspect of the other that is their skin colour; continue to be ‘invoked’. We are forever called to be in-relation, but what of ‘the dissenter’? S/he who does not share your beliefs as to what it means to be embodied within one skin colour as opposed to another? Is s/he doomed to seek confirmation, and affirmation in-relation to, and with others, in ways that challenge his/her self-of-the-human-person? To what extent does A Black man’s perception of his own skin colour ensure that he is perceived as being someone; a self-of-being; that appears to be, persistently, at odds with those who do not appear to value this aspect of his/her person; neither aesthetically, nor functionally? Are the Existential concerns of the Black person so important that s/he must seek to opportunities, which threaten the possibility of extinction in-relation with others?

To answer these philosophical questions, I have resorted to search ancient Canaanite mythology to establish a basis for discrimination that may be experienced as ‘social exclusion’. I have chosen Canaanite mythology, primarily, because it seems to have been transcribed into different languages, and reinterpreted to suit a given culture, without losing much of its very ‘essence’. It is, also, very old, (i.e. 1500 BCE).

Ancient Historical Views on Oppression:

In the Canaanite text, a Babylonian King, Tilgarth-Pilneser, (circa. 716 BCE) was scorned by Isaiah, a prophet of the 7th century BC, for his pride and crimes against the Israelites (Wood, 1908). Godwin (1990) transcribes the Canaanite text to read:

How thou hast fallen from Heaven, Helel, Son of Shaher,
Thou didst say in thy heart, I will ascend to Heaven,

Above the circumpolar stars I will raise my throne,
And I will dwell in the Assembled Body in Mount Sapon,
I will mount on the back of a Cloud,
I will be like the 'Most High'

(Ibid, pg91-92)

'Helel' or 'Lucifer', 'Son of the Dawn', and 'Bringer of Light', it is argued, was 'a dissenter' in the Heavens. We are lead to believe that Lucifer questioned the ability of Humankind to remain faithful to God in the face of adversity. His reasons for so doing are unclear. However, the Bible does tell of his numerous "trips" to Earth to test-out Mankind's propensity to disobedience (i.e. sin). I am not entirely convinced as to the autonomy of 'Satan, the Accuser's' actions. It would seem that God himself sat in judgement as to the worthiness of mankind, and usurped 'Archangel Michael', and the Nephilim, Helel, in this project. It seems that in Mankind's defence, Archangel Michael attempts to show that some of humankind is more worthy than others. In accusation, He'lel sets out to show the contrary. The Bible makes many references to the 'Morning Star', insisting that, 'Archangel Michael will become as the Morning Star (Rev. 22.16). In particular, the way Isaiah (14:12-22); and other contributors to the Bible; make the analogies between the behaviour of the 'King of Babylon'; and relate this behaviour with 'Lucifer, Son of the Dawn'. It was suggested that King Tilgarth-Pilneser had exalted himself over an above others in much the same way as the 'Morning Star' (planet 'Venus') appears to do as she rises high in the Dawn sky in lieu of the Sun rising.

'Satan, the Accuser', does not appear to 'mock' God in the same ways as Isaiah appears to be 'mocking' the Kings of Babylon in the Bible. Instead, He'lel (Satan Lucifer) merely seems to be doing the Lord God's bidding, (i.e. creating adversity, or inflicting suffering with God's permission). In so doing, Mankind is confronted with life's many difficulties. We appear to be tempted towards disobedience to God, (i.e. to sin). In 'mocking' the 'King of Babylon', whose pride was reflected in his efforts to assume a place in Heaven; though seated high above the 'Most High'; Isaiah showed; in parable; how pompous this King of Babylon really was in his ways of being. In the same ways as 'Satan, The Accuser', sets out to prove that mankind would, readily, denounce 'Jehovah' in the face of adversity, The Kings of Babylon too, will be cut down, and thrown into the 'bottomless pit' for his crimes against humanity.

It was interesting to read how the King of Babylon's belief in his own ways of being-in-the-world, reflected his cultural beliefs about 'hero worship' of that time: something not uncommon at the time (Wood, 1908). He commented on 'how filled with pride', this 'King of Babylon' assumed that he would 'hold counsel with the Assembled Body', and how he would 'set his throne above that of, God Himself'; in spite of his own apparent crimes against humanity. Clearly, these 'Kings of Babylon' did not consider their exploits to be 'crimes'. These ancient Kings desired to be worshipped as 'heroes', and therefore, were unlikely to experience 'guilt'. But the Canaanite text, also, suggests that Lucifer did nothing without prior consultation with God, and usually, in the apparent hope of proving to God that humankind was unworthy of God's adoration and trust. He doubted that Humankind could withstand too much pain and suffering, and yet Lucifer experienced no pain, and suffering himself. We hear tell of the way in which he moved freely about the heavens, apparently unchallenged, and having the ear of

God himself, and yet Lucifer seems unsatisfied with this. He sought to show God how mistaken he was to give Humankind freedom to choose – free will. Yet Lucifer never proclaims his own free will. His behaviour suggests that he has no love for mankind, yet he never actually says so, himself. He seems to fear God, and this may deter him from making direct challenges to authority. He certainly does not seem to want ‘exalt his throne over and above God’s’. Lucifer, as with other members of the Angelic Host do not appear to possess free will. They exist only in-relation to God himself. Only God turns to Lucifer, and makes him present. We are Lucifer does nothing without God’s blessing. Where’s as humankind are able to make mistakes, to exercise their ‘free will’ to chose one form of expressing themselves over and above another.

It was the ‘King of Babylon’ who appears to have been denied a sense of self-importance before God, the ‘greater good’. ‘Pride came before the Fall’, but why does God (“the greater good”) demand that all no-one should set themselves in higher authority than He, and deny us the right to hold counsel with Him in much the same way as ‘Michael’, and ‘Helel’? In the same ways, are we, as human beings, not playing-out this same story here on Earth, over and over again, to the detriment of those who are considered dissimilar enough from those who assume godlike status within the context of our everyday lives? Is ‘the dissenter’ required to ask permission before assuming the same rights as those who would assume such self-importance, and in so doing exalt themselves over and above everyone else? Are we doomed to set those against whom we discriminate on the grounds of skin colour a part, without making them independent in-relation with the ‘dominant culture’; the self-acclaimed ‘greater good’ for time immemorial?

‘There is not one personality trait of the Negro the source of which can not be traced to difficult living conditions. There is no exception too the rule. The final result is wretched internal life’

Kardiner and Ovesey (1951:3)

Human beings, who are forced to live under Ghetto conditions, and whose daily experiences tells them, that almost no where in society are they respected, and granted the ordinary dignity and courtesy accorded others will begin to doubt their self-worth

Kenneth Clarke (1965: 63)

Is Social Exclusion: inevitable

Pondering this state of affairs within the context of my own everyday life. I have wondered whether the phenomena of ‘setting aside without making independent’ are new, and simply are reflection of the human condition. History seems saturated with the assertion of one scheme of things over and above another such that one civilisation, or way of being-in-the-world, assumes relative superiority over and above another, with the subjugation of ‘the other’. ‘The other’ has been set aside without making independent. Historical documents like the Bible is full of stories which show how this struggle for individual identity and power in-relation between, and within’ ancient societies is often foretold by a ‘man of vision’ – the prophet. The idea of setting oneself above one person/people seems to be followed by the subjugation of that which would set itself above and against another becomes inevitable. Whether this is a simple reflection of what has happened in the past, or whether this is

simply wishful thinking remains difficult to ascertain. Suffice to say that all-things-considered; such prophecies would not seem unreasonable in the 'greater scheme of things'.

Uncovering the earliest accounts of this ways of being-in-the-world, it is said that, 'In the beginning, God created all living things, and demanded that their talents be used to glorify Him'. But He'lel; more commonly referred to as 'Satan' or 'Lucifer', is alleged to have said unto himself, 'am I not worthy of praise', am I not as the bright, and Morning Star, and God allegedly said, 'no - only I am worthy of praise'. For his transgression in-relation to God, He'lel, is said to have been 'thrown to Earth' (Rev.12:8). The bible says, 'Woe for the Earth, and the Sea, for Satan has come down to You with great wrath knowing his time is short' (Rev. 12:12). He'lel, may have been aware of her own self-importance; after all he was allegedly 'choirmaster of one third of the heavenly throng'. Perhaps, she could not accept that mankind could be as deserved of God's love and admiration as he was? Helel seemed to be demanding that, 'he experience a sense of value that was greater than that accorded to mankind', and tried to show her greater worthiness in-relation to mankind, by showing God the extent of humankind unworthiness— the sin of mankind.

Interestingly, Helel never seemed to speak her grievances to God. She never revealed those aspects of herself that would have suggested how vulnerable she felt in-relation with mankind. At no time do we read about how he said, 'I feel unworthy, neglected, annoyed, angry, jealous, or disaffected', in-relation to God. He, merely, reported on the transgressions of mankind in the face of adversity. God, in judging this heavenly debate gave, both the Defence, represented by 'Michael', and the Plaintiff, represented by 'Helel', a finite time-frame within which to collate evidence for, and against, the claim that in the face of adversity, mankind would sin, (i.e. be disobedience to God).

It is unfortunate, that He' lel chose humankind to prove her point. In dialectic debate with God, he attempts to show how people can lose faith in the face of adversity (Book of Job). God apparently sanctions the prevalence of this 'illusion', and offers He 'lel the caveat of human weakness as her 'tool'. In fact, it is Helel's 'will-to-power', that is thwarted; not that of humankind. He 'lel sets out to deceive, and tempt mankind saying, 'that art thou, sinner', but he never seems to be able to collate enough evidence to convince the heavenly Court of mankind's unworthiness. Helel has proven that mankind could be disobedient, but the extent of that disobedience is not 'an absolute'. He 'lel has been shown that 'Pride often came before the Fall', but the idea that such a fate would beset her for he has never made his own, personal, Existential doubt intentions known to God. He soldiers on; collating more, and more, evidence knowing that his time within which he must show how unworthy mankind is, is in-itself-for-itself. It is clear that, Helel fears God enough to refrain from, courageously, informing him of her own concerns. He fears being 'authentic' in-relation with God, and in so doing, seems to avoid experiencing His wrath, personally. (Humankind seems oblivious, or indifferent to this fear). It could be argued that Helel is aware of the God's great power; having been there at the Beginning; but, to continue to 'hide' his own desires in the ways that he has, and to use mankind; almost, as a vehicle for her deliberations with God; seems 'unfair'. He 'lel appears to be knowledgeable, but does not seem to know, enough. In usurping the serpent in the Garden of Eden, he argues that eating from the 'Tree of Life' would open Eve's eyes, and that Eve would 'know' the difference between 'Good' and 'Evil', and in so doing, become 'more like God' (Genesis Ch. 3).

The idea of the God using Mankind in these ways is not uncommon. Greek Mythology seems to be full of stories showing how the God's toyed with mankind in one-way, or another. In Greek Mythology too, man is readily set aside, but never made independent. By this I mean there is always the fear of injunction, hanging like the 'Sword of Damocles' over mankind's head. There is no escape, nor avoidance, here either. But 'why' does God ("the greater good") not want mankind to know the difference between 'Good' and 'Evil', and in so doing, become more like Him?

It is assumed that when 'our eyes are opened', we come to see the world-around-us in all it's splendour, surprise, and mystery. We become more aware of the significance of being-in-the-world, and how this may differ from our own sense of being-with-ourselves. This can but give rise to Existential angst, and anxiety. Transcendence, and the process of becoming seems require knowledge of self in-relation to, and with, the lived-world, and that being-for-ourselves requires the dynamic movement of information between the 'self of the human person', and the world-around us, to create a self-of-being that is reflective of this dynamicity and knowledge. From this discourse, we create a 'self of being' that reflects the extent to which we are autonomous, and independent. We realise that we are 'free to choose' within the constraints that prevail at that time, that we are alone, ultimately, and that our lives when devoid of 'faith' seem to hold little meaning for us: after all where is the struggle in life without 'faith'. For 'Adam' and 'Eve', their 'self of being' was in-relation to, and with themselves, and God. They seem to have been either unaware, or unconcerned about, their 'nakedness' prior to eating from the 'Tree of Life'. After eating their eyes became open, and suddenly, that within which they were embodied – their 'nakedness' — became revealed to them as something they should hide from God, and themselves. They seem to have forgotten that God made was present when they were made: He had seen their 'nakedness'. But 'Adam' and 'Eve' thought it fitting to hide their 'self of the human person', and become this 'self of being-in-the-world' the reflected their newfound knowledge of 'nakedness'.

Clearly, 'knowledge' is a dangerous commodity that is reserved only for God, or the 'greater good'. In these ways, God (or the greater good) seems to protect us from ourselves, by preventing us from experiencing anxiety and angst. By controlling the extent to which are 'autonomous', 'free to choose', alive, and meaningless, He allowed the 'self of the human person' to remain an enigma; a mystery; to ourselves in-relation to, and with God. In isolation from God (the 'eternal'), we are confronted with the possibility of experiencing 'nothingness' (Kierkegaard, 1844). Instead of 'turning outwards', we turn inwards; after all, God has deserted us. We become aware of the difference between what we were asked to do, (i.e. our 'selves of the human person'), and what we did do, (i.e. our 'selves of being'). We become more aware of that within which we are embodied, how this might differ from others, and become enthused with doubt as to its significance in-relation to the world-around-us. God is no longer able/willing to say 'that art thou' for you have 'hidden' yourselves.

God may have been aware of Adam and Eve's nakedness, but sought to prevent them from 'discovering' this for themselves in-relation with both himself, and with each other. He forbade them to eat of the 'Tree of Life' that would enable them to 'discover' that which had previously remained 'hidden', and hence remain ignorant of themselves, and doomed to an existence that could not become anything more than it that which God desired. Their 'self of being' in-relation to, and with their lived-world showed no dynamicity until the eat the

forbidden fruit, and in so doing, they became aware of the 'essence' of God. In the same ways, those who would aspire to the lofty heights of the 'greater good' also seem to deny access to information from those who would chose to discover themselves in relation to the 'greater good'. They protest that, 'it is for our own good that this knowledge be withheld'. But, is it not a greater truth that, in not offering opportunities that would increase our life chances, the 'greater good' inhibits us from becoming anything more than we are, (i.e. a product of their creation, to be used and abused at will, without possibility of recourse)? Are we not doomed to an interdependence that is reflective of a lived-world without end?

If, we make an analogy between 'the greater good' as representing the 'dominant culture within any given society', and 'Helel' as representing the 'disaffected grouping within any given society', it would seem that the dominant culture within our society must curtail the desire to 'be', and to 'become' in those who would like to transcend their everyday experiences in-relation to the dominant culture, (i.e. those who often feel disaffected within our society). The dominant culture must risk being confronted with the possibility of appearing no greater than anybody else. The apparent fear of some sort of annihilation deters the 'setting of the other a part', and 'making independent', those who would be like 'God' (Buber, 1966). It is assumed that where there are those within any society who would value themselves over and above all those, there will be those who will question the moral judgement of the apparent social order with varying effect.

Inasmuch as those who share similar defining features as those of 'greater good', the current 'order of things' must be judged unsustainable, overtime. Those societies where "individual glorification", and a "sense of self-worth", may only be experienced within the context of genuine dialogue, increasing the proximal distance between self, and the other, merely serves to denounce the existence of the other, and render him/herself, inhuman. Those who value themselves over and above others with inevitable dire consequences may be forced to consider he possibility that their own existential concerns are, inextricably, interwoven with those the disaffected members of society. In denying the human existence of those who do not share 'enough' of their own defining features, and in failing to 'make present' the other through the process of genuine dialogue, the 'greater good' may well be sealing its own fate, and annihilation (Nietzsche, 1882). In offering the individual the opportunity to value only those who would be like 'God, the greater good', a sense of individual self-worth becomes obscure, and denied, beyond the testimony to this fact by those who would assume the role of the 'greater good'. Creativity that is, arguably, common to all seems 'thwarted' in-relation to, an with, those who have assume this role within any given society.

This 'primary schemata' seems to be reflected within the global society today, and to have been since time immemorial, apparently. Some aspects of 'self' seem to given permission for expression, whilst there are those 'defining features' which others do not share, and still find difficult to accept as 'being of equal value'. Western society has outlawed 'discrimination' based on skin colour, gender, sexual orientation, even disability, etc., but those who possess these defining features do not seem to be benefiting from such changes in the Law. 'Discrimination' has become founded on a 'system of beliefs', which remain either 'hidden', or expressed covertly. Consequently, challenges to such expression remain difficult at the best of times. How do you challenge something that appears to

be represented in the behaviour of others without the other making explicit claims to their presence within the context of genuine dialogue with those experiencing discrimination? It is not my intention to enter into dialectic about what this system of beliefs may be. However, attempts to elucidate how such values/beliefs appears to inform behaviour, which on interpretation, can lead to emotional distress, and poor health in those people who experience discrimination as an integral part of their everyday lives. The illegality of discrimination based on skin colour ensures that discriminatory beliefs often remain hidden, and hence the validity of such challenges seems difficult irrespective of the given context. It, therefore, remains for those disaffected to become more aware of their own thoughts and feelings in-relation with those who appear to be discriminating against them, and reinterpret such behaviour in-relation with their lived-worlds such that the 'transcendence' is shown beyond that which may otherwise be expected.

Those of us, who would value their own defining features above and against those who do not share the same defining features, seem to show little concern for those affected by their discriminatory behaviour. Such people do not seem to be, overly, concerned with the well-being of mankind in totality, and show this by ensuring that their privileged position is maintained in-relation to everyone else, and regardless of the cost in human suffering. We can not say that such people are unaware that their social status is inextricably linked to that of everyone else, as considerable effort seems to go into maintaining the prevailing social order. This shows significance where we consider that those who discriminate often determine, and apportion opportunity. In recognising others who do not share the same defining features, those who discriminate are asked to re-evaluate their own sedimentations about self in relation to those who appear to be, significantly, different. It is almost as, if, their own sense of value is being challenged in some way. But this would not be the case, if, those who discriminated against others accepted the possibility that their defining features were no more of value than those of others - just 'different'. Hence, 'how' in a society where the boundaries between self, and others are being, continually, eroded do you initiate a system of beliefs that values 'difference'; whilst, maintaining the lower echelons of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, (i.e. life sustenance, safety and security, etc.); where there are certain groupings within our society who would demand that a discriminating social order be maintained, overtime? If, it is argued that certain needs may be met by some at the expense of others, (e.g. creativity, self-expression that differentiates 'self' from others, etc.), are we not at risk of destroying 'humanity', itself?

It concerns me that many young people today, irrespective of their skin colour, seem to value the use of illegal drugs for their "anaesthetising effect". Within the context of our everyday lives, and in spite of guidance normally associated with religiosity amongst younger people, these drugs have become the 'the new god'. It is, too, simplistic to state that they have replaced God as the 'opiate of the people'; a means of consolation, or quiescence; essential for ensuring much needed 'avoidance/escapism' from a tiresome reality of everyday life in the absence of answers to this persistent question. Yet, others have chosen to use the legal drugs prevalent within our society to achieve the same effect! Still, others seem to have chosen other ways of destroying; in one-way, or another; those that which no longer provides enough protection as the Existential givens that they fear would thwart their very existence (Yalom, 1980). In the middle of this continuum, there are those who

'tread the fine line' between existence, and non-existence - 'to be or not be', (this remains the question), and 'suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune' from which there seems to be no escape, nor avoidance (Jaspers, 1951; Van Deurzen-Smith, 1997, pg 72). Are not doomed to 'struggle' in our everyday lives? No one seems to have the answer because the converse of the original argument seems to be, equally, true; yet 'Helel', in his covert revolt, implies by her actions that there is an answer. I remain uncertain. In ceasing to be autonomous, and accepting our interdependence, there is nothing with which to struggle with our everyday lives, the self of the human person disappears from view, and has no meaning. In accepting our autonomy, we do not accept our interdependence, we struggle with our everyday lives, the self of human person is 'hidden' behind the 'self of being' in-relation with the lived-world, often inadvertently. In both scenarios, the 'self of the human person' seems to remain 'hidden' from view. Hence, the outcome is the same - annihilation.

Yet, I ponder the question as to 'what this 'greater good' is, as history dictates that, as even this seems to shift with the passage of time, and place, and hence remains open to interpretation? In becoming more like God, we threaten the status of God within the greater scheme of things. Can we not all be Gods together? Apparently, not. Despite our varying talents we can not all be as God's in our own right, with our own special talents, and ways of being-in-the-world that reflect the 'truth' of our 'self-as the-human-person. The 'greater good' has decreed it, and we are engaged in battle with the 'greater good' who denies us the know-how on the basis that we will turn away from that which exalts itself over and above us, on fear of annihilation. In this sense, Nietzsche claims that, 'God is dead'. We have turned away from Him, and in so doing, brought the world-around-us into view.

Hence, we continue to 'throw ourselves' into a lived-world of 'uncertainty'. We are not thrown as suggested by Husserl (1929), as this would deny the existence of 'intentionality'. By this I mean that our behaviour shows some degree of intentionality. We attend to some aspects of our everyday existence, and ignore others. We, selectively, bring into consciousness aspects of our being-in-the-world, whilst at the same time ignoring others. We do not find ourselves in particular situations, we are not 'thrown', *per se*, we enter into them, purposefully, and hence, we appear to 'throw' ourselves: always uncertain of the outcome, and the temporality of our being-in-the-world. Our existence, persistently, challenged from one moment to the next, and void of any conclusion that would relieve our 'inner tensions'. Our emotions swell, and colour our interpretation of our 'lived-worlds' to the extent that we seem to lose sight of the content of our 'self-reflective knowledge'. We are in-relation to, and with, in our lived-worlds in ways which can but 'objectify' others (Kierkegaard, 1844/1980; 1849/1980). We know about our lived-worlds than we know about ourselves. We seem to be blind to the view that 'what we see in others' tells us more about ourselves than it will ever do about the other. It is hoped that a thorough phenomenological investigation (Husserl, 1925; Ihde, 1986) into the experience of discrimination that appears to be based on skin colour; as opposed to 'race'; will do much to illuminate this phenomena we call discrimination, in-itself, and in so doing, present a way forward for people of colour; if, not humanity itself.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISSOCIATION, AND BLACK MEN'S SENSE OF IDENTITY

'Dissociation' seems to be characterised by distinct changes in a person's sense of identity, memory, or consciousness (Davison and Neale, 1994, p178). However, 'depersonalisation', is a form of 'dissociative disorder' which characterised by 'a loss of self', but there seems to be no obvious disturbance in memory, nor 'flow of consciousness', and the individual does not display more than one ego state. It is suggested that 'Schizophrenia' is a much more intense form of depersonalisation, and as such quite different from 'a true dissociative disorder' such as 'multiple personality disorder'. The criteria for diagnosis of 'a dissociative disorder' requires that the individual demonstrates a 'loss of memory', and that the different 'alter egos' identified are quite separate comprising a fully integrated, and complex, set of behaviour patterns, memories, and relationships, at any one time (Davison and Neale, 1994, p180).

However, it could be argued that some 'Black' people seem to 'learn' how to dissociate their true thoughts and feelings about their 'Blackness' from their apparent thoughts and feelings, and almost assume a 'second identity' in response to 'racial' discrimination (Sue, 1981; Rack, 1982; Rose, 1997). Whether such dissociation is indicative of 'mental illness', has yet to be determined (Dunn et al, 1994). However, it could be argued that dissociating one's true feelings about his/her skin colour may, actually, be a normal process'; more prevalent and, perhaps more pronounced in Black people who may be, experiencing emotional distress as a consequence of other factors prevalent within their daily lives, (e.g. socioeconomic, or health factors), concomitantly. But to suggest that such dissociation is indicative of the presence of 'mental illness', seems restrictive, and says very little about the effect prevalent adversity may have within the context of Black people's lives.

Differentiating between criteria that would be indicative of 'a dissociative disorder', and that which would typify 'depersonalisation', seems difficult. On the one hand, slight deviation from the 'norm' which is personal integrity, observed in some Black people, may well be a meaningful way of 'separating-out' those aspects of self with which the 'ego' finds difficult to cope. No loss of memory, nor flow of consciousness, is observed. This kind of dissociation observed in some Black people may, then, be viewed a pervasive, but 'normal': an adaptive response to the felt experience of discrimination based, purely, on the colour of their skin, (i.e. such as that described by Rose, 1997). On the other, deviation from that which may be considered to be reflective of a more intense form of dissociation, (i.e. tending to a multiple personality disorders), where the individual seems to be demonstrating a number of different personalities, (i.e. one constructed to change the interpretation of their everyday lives at the same time and place), would suggest that the individual is unable to accept their skin colouration and personal integrity may be 'sacrificed' for greater social acceptance, elsewhere. The denial of; or the expression of anger directed at; such an important aspect of 'self', may carry with it, as yet, undefined consequences for the health and well-being of Black communities in the United Kingdom. Many writers have commented on how extreme expressions of personal distress come to be

'labelled' as the expression of 'Schizophrenia', in Black people, and further, de-lineation may need to be carried out to determine a definitive diagnosis (Dunn et al, 1994).

It is argued that the association between dissociation, and mental illness, can not, possibly, hold true for all Black people who suffer discrimination in the United Kingdom, therefore, at one level, there must be some useful purpose in its continued persistence within British-born Black people. Psychoanalysts suggest that dissociative disorders arise as the individual, successfully represses, 'separates-out' from, or 'dis-owns' those internal conflicts s/he finds difficult, or unable, to cope with at anyone time and place (Buss, 1966). Social Learning theorists suggest that the individual purposefully, 'avoids', and/or attempts to 'escape from', the consequences of a personal evaluation of identified inconsistencies between his/her concept of self, and that of the individual's external environment. There seems to be little difference between the explanations for dissociative disorders given by the Psychoanalysts, and that given by the Social learning theorists, although the language used might give that impression. The common factor, represented in each explanation remains the same. Black people experience real anxiety, which may be directly related to the difference between the meaning s/he attributes to his/her own skin colour, and that s/he believes others hold about his/her skin colour. Spinelli (1994) supposes 'dissonance between beliefs about one's self and the experience of one's self in relation with others' (Ibid, pp 222). In such situations, the Black person may choose to either, actively, (or other-wise), 'disown' that aspect of self, or 'defend' him/herself against such experience(s), by either behaving in a ways that are reflective of someone who appears to be denying the existence of their own skin colouration. The annoyance, and anger, that seems to be invoked in relation with those who appear to be behaving discriminatorily, is expressed to varying degrees and effectively sets the other a part without making the independent. No-one has said, 'that art thou' when discrimination is expressed covertly, but in situations where discrimination is expressed overtly anger is externalised, the self of the human person is made present, and independent, and the others is in no doubt as to the reasons for the angry outburst. The anger when externalised informs the other of the ways in which the Black person may be in 'fear' of annihilation during the social interaction that takes place within the context of everyday lives; respectively.

The following sections will attempt to establish a basis for such behaviour, and go on determine some of the possible consequences of such dissociation, and look at a possible role for counsellor and psychotherapist in their capacity to help and support Black people in the United Kingdom.

On The Question Of Perception:

'Perception' may be defined as the process by which an individual creates a 'mental representation', or 'construct' of his/her experience. From birth, the individual may shown to be, continually, 'taking-in' information through his/her senses, and using it to construct a view of the world in which s/he finds themselves. This view of the world will, undoubtedly, be based on that individual's interpretation of sensory experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1968). As none as us live in 'a social vacuum', some of these 'psychological constructs' may be 'shared' by others, as may the relationship between various objects external to self. Fundamentally, however, that individual's view of the world may be

said to, entirely, personal. Where an individual's perception of the world is 'shared' by others, the individual may be said to have 'internalised a view of the world that is a reflexive of his/her perception of experience that is shared'; of being-with-others in the society in which s/he has chosen to life.

If, as it is assumed, 'perception' is a construct of an individual's experience, and as such unique, then that person may be said to have constructed a sense of reality which; in itself is 'unique' (Beck et al, 1990). In response to the varying activation of sensory neurons in different areas of the cerebral cortex, the individual determines the defining features of objects in his/her external environment, and internally represents them, symbolically (Kuffler, 1953). Whilst most theorists agree that most individuals are born with some ability to sense 'objects' within their perceptual field, it is not clear whether or not the ability to distinguish one 'object' from another is learnt, or inherited. Some theorists argue that in the first few months of life, the infant is unable to distinguish one object in its immediate environment, from another; the infants perceptual field is said to be 'confused' (James, 1890). Gradually, overtime, the infant becomes more aware of people, and other objects in its immediate environment, and even its own reflection in a mirror. This increase in perceptual ability coincides with the natural development and refinement of the infant's motor, and sensory skills (Piaget, 1952); sensation being near perfect by the time the infant is two months old (Bower, 1982). Most theorists, now, agree that babies are able to 'order' their experiences from birth; albeit primitive, in function, however, spatial perception is thought to be innate (Kant, 1958).

If, it is argued that distinction between one object and another is based on of the retinal image, the level of activation of sensory cells affected, and the level of background distraction, then perception becomes meaningful as the individual 'tests-out' their hypotheses for the object's existence against a template of expectation (Gregory, 1972). Perception then, arises from the extraction of specific information about objects, and the context in which they occur based on comparisons made between that which is attended to, selectively, and templates of that which has already been stored in the memory (Neisser, 1976). However, Gibson (1986) argues that there is no need to, continuously, check and test-out hypotheses based on the possibility of the presence, or absence, within a particular filed of experience as against previously, as such information is, already, present at birth.

Evidence of Gibson's theory was provided by the 'visual cliff' experiment in which a baby refused to be coaxed in to traversing a glass sheet even though it new that no possible harm could come to it. For, Gibson (1969) this ability to perceive depth, and relate depth to the experience of possible danger, was present at birth, and not learnt: the individual simply has to 'sense' danger. Data-driven processing enabled the baby to 'sense' perceptual depth, and equated this with imminent danger. However, Gregory and Wallace (1963) argued that it was not possible to 'know' the meaning of this relationship without prior experience, and they cited the story of a 52 year old man, who had been blind at birth, who when his sight was restored at the age of 52 years, he assumed that he could touch the ground forty feet beneath the window in his bedroom if he had hung out it. This implies that visual perception is only part of the decision-making process, and that auditory, and perception of movement together may play a part in gaining personal knowledge about the lived-world.

Determining how individuals perceive the world around is important in that perception can often be deceiving, and informs future action. If, it is argued that individuals are born with an innate

sense of perceptual depth, for instance, how do they relate this sense of perceptual depth with imminent danger: how do they determine it's meaning without prior experience, or knowledge. It is possible to understand how individuals may construct a view of the world in which Black men are perceived as being 'threatening', 'violent' and 'untrustworthy', based on information gained from a range of different sources, (e.g. the media). But, how can individuals purport to 'know' this about any one particular Black person, and then relate the presence of personal attributes/defining features, such as Black skin, with imminent danger, without prior knowledge of what Black skin colouration signifies for them as individuals?

Given the probability that the child does not live in a horizontal world, it could be argued that the child had prior 'knowledge' of the effect 'gravity' has had on him/her in the past, and has associated the falling sensation with imminent danger prior to taking part in the experiment, hence the observed response. In the absence of prior knowledge of being in-relation with, and as a consequence having been prior experience of the possible danger of interacting with Black men in general, such negative assumptions about Black men, for instance, must be considered to be 'unfounded'.

A Historical Basis for Commonly Held Beliefs About Skin Colour

Investigating societal beliefs reflected in observed attitudes, and behaviour, towards people of colour seems to have had a long tradition with the field of psychology. Though most of the evidence supporting the view that racial discrimination persists derives from American literature, it may no doubt be applicable when considering how research concerning societal evaluation of skin colour informs Western society as a whole. Within the constraints of an 'inferiority paradigm', racism seems to have grown out of a belief that people of colour were a subspecies of 'Homo sapiens sapiens' by 'White' elitist explorers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, and as such considered 'inferior' (Fredrickson, 1971, p90). Throughout, the nineteenth century, until this very day there are academics, and 'learned people', have contributed to the social, and scientific, 'evidence' that promotes, sustains, and perpetuates the idea of White racial superiority, and visible racial/ethnic group inferiority (Fredrickson 1989, p201; Carter, 1995, p29; Owusu-Bempah and Howitt, 1999, p126).

To begin with, Fredrickson suggests that 'Negro inferiority was considered an unchangeable fact of nature' (1971, p83). With the advent of 'psychology' as a science, academics sought new ways of explaining, and attempting to elucidate the significance of difference amongst human groups. Guthrie (1976, p32) describes how the early anthropologists tried to classify 'races' according to 'skin colour', 'hair texture', and 'lip thickness', concluding that Black people belonged to the 'lowest division of mankind'. Scientific investigation changed from biological, and anthropological, determination of 'difference', to the determination of differences in 'cognitive ability' (e.g. Jensen, 1969). Despite the presentation of numerous arguments showing that skull size was not indicative of brain size, and that brain size, itself, did not, necessarily, indicate superior intelligence (Guthrie, 1976; Gould, 1981; Banton, 1987; Miles, 1989), the social sciences continue to provide support for the elite's cultural hegemony (e.g. Rushton, 1995; Jensen and Johnson, 1994; Murry and Hernstein, 1994). Such views helped reinforce the view that people of colour could be anything but 'inferior, troublesome, and

a blemish to the notion of national excellence' (Cross et al, 1978, p263). Owusu-Bempah (1999) referred to this form of racism, (i.e. the belief that Black people are inherently inferior as a consequence of their biological representation), as 'biological racism'.

Racial/ethnic group inferiority has since moved on from this, and Owusu-Bempah and Howitt (1999, p126), now, speak of 'cultural and professional racism', (i.e. the belief that certain racial/ ethnic groupings are inferior as a consequence of the cultural and professionally ascribed heritage). Now, writers and other theorists speak about Black, and indeed, other 'people of colour', according to the ways in which certain representative individuals, or representative groups within identified communities, seem to 'challenge' the prevailing social order. For example, it could be argued that the 'Dolls Studies' (Clarke and Clarke, 1947) commented on how young children discriminated between Black, and White dolls, and this challenged the prevailing academic social order because Black people were, inherently, expected to align themselves with their 'own kind', and to accept their inferiority status as a consequence of their 'natural inheritance'. To want to 'be' anything different may be construed as 'posing a threat to the prevailing social order'. Comparisons seem to be made between that which is construed as being desirable social behaviour, and that which is 'observed' to be different from that identified form of desirable social behaviour. Little reference is made to those who determine the social order; nor, to the difference in 'how' these social constraints may direct social behaviour between various communities within any given society; nor, to the extent that these differences may be exhibited by other groupings within the same community who may, also, be similarly, constrained. Further, little comment seems to be made as to 'how' identified individuals, or groupings within these communities, view their situation, and how they interpret their experiences of within the context of their everyday lives.

Overall, then, it seems that both 'cultural', and 'professional', racism is more akin to an indication of the way various professional, and academic, agencies to reflect on their findings. Often, such reflection seems to be 'critical'; if, not wholly accurate; in reference to that about which they are reporting. Articles about Black people seem on the whole 'critical' of some aspect of Black existence; black people have become a source of societal conflict whether that be academic, or otherwise, (e.g. 'The Psychologist', 1999, pp 126-139). The findings of studies such as Cross (1985), Milner (1983), Clark (1992) may seem to be, seriously, flawed. Not because they fail to support, or refute, the Black 'self-hated' theory (Owusu-Bempah, 1999, p127), but possibly because they fail to, successfully, evaluate Black people views on 'the concept of skin colour', and what it 'means' to those possessing such defining features. What does it mean to be a Black person, or indeed, to be any other person of colour; within a given society?

'Meaning' is all to, often, 'inferred', (e.g. that possessing a Black skin colouration childrens' self-concept is, somehow, defective, and therefore Black childrens' self-concept is 'defective', as suggested by Ann Phoenix, 1999, p134), and used for varying purposes, (e.g. to oppose racial segregation in the USA, as suggested by Steve Reicher (1999, p132). This view is, further, illustrated by Banks (1992, p33-34), in the way Black people, themselves, can communicate to their children, negative overtones about the colour of skin which has nothing to do with the colour of their skin. Academics, and professionals alike, might ask themselves whether, or not, they would, purposefully,

identify with any aspect of themselves about which, overtime, others criticise, systematically (as illustrated by Steve Biko, 1988, p43); especially, where such criticisms are documented time, and time again (Reicher, 1999, p133). The problem as it has been suggested, seems to lie, not simply in the explanation given for the way some Black (and other people of colour) maybe observed to behave, but also, in the reporting of such behaviour.

The Way People Might Make Self-Descriptions

Individuals are, continually, making value judgments about themselves based on information they collect, and evaluate, from their being-in-relation-to/with-others in their lived-world (Van Deurzen-Smith, 1997, pg 238). Individuals seem overly concerned with those aspects of self, (e.g. personal characteristics), which emphasise difference (Wetherell, 1995, p191). Some anthropologists (e.g. Geertz, 1984) argue that 'individualism' is unique to western society, but it may be argued that most societies seem to attach 'labels' to certain aspects of the individual, which then sets them a part from themselves. For example, differentiation based on 'gender', or 'social status', or 'birth-order'. Such social constructs; in themselves; enable differentiation, and hence, 'individuation' within any given community, and it is from the response to these points of difference that self may then be constructed, overtime (Mead, 1934; Rosenburg, 1979; Maccoby, 1980). But it is precisely that which makes us 'different' that dictates the extent to which we are able to engage in genuine dialogue with each other.

The child's first steps; 'on this road to self-discovery'; is the acknowledgment that s/he exists (Lewis et al, 1983). The infant discovers that s/he experiences sensation, and develops motors skills, which either enable that child to re-create, or modify such sensations. The infant may not realise that it is s/he that is the 'cause' of such experiences, and seems to devote much of his/her time in pursuit of that which seems 'pleasurable', and to make things happen (Lewis, and Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Meltzoff, 1990). Further, infants seem to enjoy exerting their innate power over other 'objects' in their immediate environment in a way, which seems to be 'gender-specific' (Bem, 1983). This may be reinforced within the context of parental care. During infancy, most of the child's demands are, usually, met, and it is not until the child discovers that s/he can not always get whatever it is that s/he wants that s/he is develops 'skills of negotiation'. Challenges to 'autonomy', and self-expression during the child's everyday interactions seem to encourage the development of self as the child 'learns' that which is, and that which is not permissible during social interaction (Turner, 1968; Dunn and Kendrick, 1982).

Overtime, the nature, and number of different objects the child encounters in his/her immediate environment, changes (Eysenck, 1954). It is argued that overtime, the child come to realise that they are often subject to the will of others. This concept is reflected in the way children describe themselves in relation to others. Younger children seem to describe themselves using physical features, and giving account of their activities and behaviours, whilst, older children tend to describe themselves using terms that suggest an interpretation of what they believe these behaviour mean (Bannister and Agnew, 1977). In describing self, children are, also, denoting ways in which they might be the same, and also, different from others. The use of language further facilitates this process (Rosenburg, 1979).

S/he gains greater awareness of the 'effect' his/her behaviour can have on others, (e.g. anger, or laughter), and learns how to co-operate with other; manipulate his/her own environment in order to achieve a predetermined outcome (Coopersmith, 1967; Harter and Pike, 1984; Bretherton et al, 1986). The 'balance of power' seems to be greater when interacting with others in the same age bracket, and this may explain why children seem to prefer to associate with other children of similar age. Through play, children learn how they might relate to others. The views of others seem to hold greater importance, overtime (Erikson, 1963), so much so that a sense of social worth becomes dependent on both cognitive and social competence. Self; a social construct; then, arises through social experience (Mead, 1934).

This 'process of change', may be illustrated by asking two groups of individuals (PA, and PB) to give verbal accounts of themselves. In two sets of interviews, each conducted over twenty minutes, a group of children, aged between seven and ten years old (PA), and their fathers, aged between 30 and 37 years old (PB), were asked to simply describe themselves. Both groups of participants were related biologically, and socially, such that it would be possible to assume both groups would share common experiences related to class and ethnic grouping, and hence construe the world using a common 'mindframe' when expressing their perceptions of themselves. The interviews were semi-structured to ensure that both groups were asked to comment on similar aspects of themselves, whilst providing a richer source of information than might be acquired utilising a more structured approach. Although, the participants were encouraged to express themselves from a standpoint of free flowing consciousness, it was, also, necessary to control the subject matter to some extent rather than allow the participants to "ramble on" about subject matter which did not relate to the topic being studied. Both groups of participants were encouraged not to think, too, much about the task, nor about the implications of the information they might give, nor about the comments they might make. It was felt that such evaluation might give them the opportunity to censor the information, and therefore, distort the validity of the findings. They were, also, assured of the total confidentiality with respect to information given.

The interviews were conducted in a quiet, well-aerated room, and attempts were made to limit interruptions, e.g. by putting a 'do not disturb' sign on the door. Timing was crucial as the need to give no indication as to there being a time limit on their responses. This, it was believed might, also, distort the validity of the information given. Tape recordings were made of the interviews, so full attention could be given to interview, and notes were taken of both verbal, and non-verbal responses with the intention of establishing congruency between verbal, and non-verbal responses. It was hoped that questioning was reflexive of that which took place during the interview, and gave clarity to responses where clarity seemed obscure. The participants were de-sensitised after the interviews by a process of reflection on the interview, and the subject matter discussed. The participants were, again, reassured of complete confidentiality, and that their relationship with the researcher would not be significantly altered as a result of the information given.

After interviewing, the tapes were reviewed, and statements were written which reflected the information, therein. Care was taken not to be subjective about the meaning behind statements made, (i.e. to document statements which reflected what was actually said, rather than give an interpretation of what was actually said). The statements were differentiated according to whether or not they referred

to: (1) physical characteristics, or activities, (2) the nature of the participants relationship to others, (3) personality, and (4) those that related to the participants more private world, (i.e. emotions, attitudes, aspirations, and beliefs). A percentage for each of the four categories was then calculated, and illustrated, using a pie chart for each participant.

It was found that younger participants tended to describe themselves in more concrete terms, (i.e. using a selection of physical characteristics, and activities, relationships, and personality characteristics that were devoid of abstract concepts, e.g. emotions). They made very few direct references to emotion, attitude, or beliefs. For example, the participants referred to age, hair and eye colour, family members, friends, sport, and subjects he liked/disliked at school, people he liked/disliked, and his general feelings in particular situations. The participants seemed quite sure about what it was they were referring to, and there seemed to be very little ambiguity in relation to statements they used to describe themselves. However, older participants, tended to refer less to physical characteristics/ attributes, and activities, and relationships to others, and this is reflected in that proportion of the pie chart denoting each of these specific areas. Also, the language used by older participants reflected a much more abstract sense of self. For example, they referred more to their relationships with others at home, at work their occupations, their personalities, (i.e. his tendency to aggression, and lack of 'nurturing' qualities), their beliefs, and their emotions, (e.g. his 'feelings towards his wife', his parents; and his concerns about his 'mother's failing health'.

The inferences that could be made from an analysis of both these groups of participants is that both groups tended to refer to what they considered to be important aspects of their everyday life when describing themselves, and to be selective in the amount of information they gave with respect to each of the four categories, (i.e. physical attributes/characteristics, activities, relationships with others, and their innermost feelings/emotions). Although, no attempt was made to elicit information beyond that which each participant was prepared to give, it was clear that most self-descriptive statements refrained from giving attitudes, or beliefs they would have portrayed the participants in a 'negative light', or possibly 'offend' the researcher. Similarly, there were few statements of 'self-directed' emotion, (i.e. expression of emotion which would suggest how they felt about themselves). This may have been an indication of their gender-learned roles, rather any denial of the existence of such emotion.

The information documented in the above study confirms the view that the quality of self-descriptions does seem to change, over time (Agnew and Bannister, 1977), and that factors such as gender (Bem, 1983), and self-esteem (Coopersmith, 1967, p5), do seem to modify the way an individual self-reports. In this study, both groups of participants were male, and few statements were made which would give any indication as to 'how' these two people felt about themselves on an emotional level. Similarly, both participants were selective with reference to the type of information given, (i.e. the information was seemingly, role-specific, and in-line with societal expectations of that which might be construed as being masculine behaviour).

In early infancy, the child's initially separates self, or 'I', from other objects in his/her immediate environment (Mead, 1934). The child finds that s/he is able to control elements in his/her immediate environment in such a way as to minimise the experience of anxiety (Piaget, 1952). This gives the child a notion that s/he is able to act on his/her environment in such a way to meet his/her desires; action is

wishful filling. Self-description reflects this ability to manipulate objects external to self, and it is not until the child is prevented from exercising such manipulation; from exercising his/her free will; that change ensues. The child may be said to construct a sense of self that is more useful than that which s/he had reflected at some time in the past.

According to schema theory, those attributes which seem to achieve some 'constancy' will, overtime; more often than not; reflect the attributes of other same-sex individuals within a given community, and ultimately, the society as a whole (Whiting and Edwards, 1988). Up until the age of seven years, children tend to describe themselves in more 'concrete' terms (Kuhn et al, 1978; Dunn and Kendrick, 1982). So, for example, children described themselves, and others, in relation to the presence, or absence, of specific aspects of their physical appearance, or whether or not they engaged in shared activities, or what possessions they or may not, have. Afterwards, children seem to describe themselves in a more 'abstract' fashion. Hence, they will describe themselves, and others, as being 'good', or 'bad', 'happy', 'naughty', or 'angry', etc., (Rosenberg, 1979). Such descriptions depend on a shared understanding of that which may be construed as being either 'good' or 'bad', and what it means to be labelled 'naughty', 'angry', or 'happy'. The formation of a good relationship between self and others seems to depend on the amount of congruency there is between personal attributes of one-self, and those of others. Children, learning how to empathise with the feelings/thoughts of others, is then able to selectively, choose the degree to which they might wish to align themselves with the thoughts and views of others (Henshall and McGuire, 1986). This is, arguably, reflected in the self-descriptions children give both of themselves, and of others.

Self-description may be shown to change, overtime, and this is reflected in the findings of this study. However, self-esteem seems to remain a product of experiences, and varies according depending on the values of the community/society in which we live, and 'value' attributable to the characteristics we may wish to portray. Hence, predicting self-reports according to age groups will not only depend on the existence of self-descriptive schema, but also, on the gender of the person of the person reporting, the value placed on such attributes by the society in that person lives, and the value s/he thinks the researcher might attribute to the prevalence of particular characteristics.

Deliberation On The Point Of Difference

'Difference', it is argued, is essential to who we are as individual people (Dupont-Joshua, 1996). Who we are as people may be constructed from a personal evaluation of 'introjects' we have observed, and/or with whom we have interacted, to date (Tansey and Burke, 1989); and the meaning we attribute to the way others respond to us as individuals (Fincham et al, 1990). This view stems directly from 'Attribution theory', it may be argued that observers attribute behaviour to the inherent dispositions of those being observed - the actors. Hence, defining features such as skin colour becomes synonymous with observed behaviour. 'Psychodynamic theory' seems to dictate that that which is observed is reflexive of a number of different 'introjects', over time. It is argued that where those introjects display a particular defining feature such as skin colour, it becomes reasonable for an observer to assume that observed behaviour is characteristic of others who share similar defining

features such as skin colour (Rose, 1997). Hence, a pervasive confusional state persists whereby, a person's actions will always be associated with such defining features as skin colour, and indicative of an ability to act, and/or behave, in a particular way with others who share a similar skin colouration.

As any explanation offered by those being observed for their own behaviour is likely to be different; to a greater or lesser degree; from that of those observing them, (e.g. 'there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute their actions to stable, personal dispositions' (Jones and Nesbitt, 1972, p80), it becomes useful to attempt to disassociate the negative connotations associated with skin colour, and adopt an attitude which distances 'self' from others who, also, share that same skin colour.

Is Such Dissociation Indicative of Health or Illness?

A person's identity may be construed as a 'complex integration of each person's psycho-social context, physical characteristics, personality attributes, unique experiences, and personal choices' (Babad et al, 1983, p37). Dissociating 'self' from the meaning associated with one's skin colour would then be indicative of a move towards health. Health may be construed as meaning more than the absence of disease but to entail the whole emotional, physical, and mental state of well being (WHO, 1983).

Whilst the incidence of 'mild transient feelings of depersonalisation, and de-realisation appear to be a 'normal' experience for most people (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986), such experiences; as may be reflected in the ways people of colour relate to others; may not be commensurable with health, a sense of well-being, and a sense of personal worth. Also, since an observer's evaluation of an individual's behaviour may seriously conflict with the individual's ideation of 'self', a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' may ensure that subsequent ways of relating, and general health disposition may; when consolidated; be perpetuated from one generation, to the next. Indeed, Rose (1997) commented on how very children bring their internalised racism to a therapeutic counselling session, and externalise their anger, shame and guilt about being 'Black', and Taylor (1982) showed how pervasive, and persistent 'shame' acquired in early childhood tends to a sense of low self-worth, powerlessness, and negative self-image. Fanon (1967, p109) argued that 'the Black man among his own in the twentieth century does not know at what moment his inferiority comes into being from other' but it would seem 'sensible', then, to dissociate in anticipation of the 'inevitable'.

If, it is argued that out of the total population of people of colour residing in the U.K., two thirds of whom would have been born there (Gordon et al, 1992), then it would not be unreasonable to assume that the majority of people residing in the U.K. will display many of the attributes prevalent within the dominant culture; hence, much of the 'culture' displayed by ethnic minorities in the U.K; would be synonymous with that of the dominant culture, (i.e. 'White, and English'). The inference, being that through the process of secondary socialisation, (e.g. school), and normal everyday interaction, most people of colour would accommodate and assimilate many of the attributes, and take on many of the 'roles' that would, normally, be associated with the dominant culture. Culture may be defined as 'a learned system of meanings which may be transmitted from one generation to the next' (Bretancourt and Lopez, 1993). It seems more a 'thing', rather than a process (as suggested by Carter,

1995, p12); and by implication; the maintenance, and perpetration of, commonly, held beliefs/ stereotypes pertaining to people of colour may, largely, be invalid. It, therefore, seems that the only point of 'difference' remaining, is that of 'skin colour'.

The Importance of 'Skin Colour' As A Defining Feature

Society as a whole seems either unwilling, or unable, to acquire and accommodate the ability to differentiate the actions of the individual, from that of a particular grouping within the wider society; especially, where the concept of a particular skin colour holds negative meaning within the society as a whole. In a similar way, 'socio-economic class' may be indicative of a way of relating, and behaving, but such a defining feature of a particular grouping within the wider society ignores the presence of other defining features, which may not be shared by all who ascribe to that particular social grouping, (i.e. 'socio-economic class'). Other social constructs such as 'ethnicity', 'culture, and 'race', seem dependent on someone determining that the measure of observed difference is great/large enough to warrant distinction based on either the presence, or absence, of such defining features within any one grouping within society, and that other defining features such as socio-cultural history, and language, Black psychology become, apparently, irrelevant (Johnson, 1990, p41; Smedley, 1993). Hence, if an observer believes that Black people behave in a particular way, and speak in a particular way, then anyone displaying these defining features of 'Blackness', speaks, and behaves, in that particular way (Taylor, 1981; Billig, 1985). Attribution, thus, becomes automatic.

Such defining features are not considered static, in time and place, but 'inheritable, fixed, and unchangeable' (Smedley, 1993, p12; p39-40). Further, any assumptions that need to be made as to the emotional, cognitive, psychological, intellectual, and moral qualities of particular grouping of people who share similar skin colouration continues to be determined by the observations of a White dominant grouping within the wider society (Allen, 1994), and used to promote a power differential which is sustained, and perpetuated from one generation to the next (Pinderhughes, 1987, p71; Carter, 1995, p88). There seems little evidence to suggest that people of colour are, now, grouped any more, differently, (e.g. socio-psychological status, as suggested by Carter, 1995, p15), nor in ways which does not contain value statements concerning an identified, particular grouping within the wider society. Even where Black stereotypes are reflexive of a change in the social reality within a given situation (Oakes et al, 1994), such stereotypes still seems to be reflexive of someone who is selectively attending to those aspects 'other' which the observer finds either 'threatening'; or warrants 'criticism'; and seems based on an evaluation of limited information.

It may be argued that person's skin colour as a defining feature, which when associated with the observed behaviour of that individual, can only dictate to the rest of society how that person is likely to behave in a given situation, and as such can not be judged indicative of the number of other people who happen to 'look' the same (Carter, 1995, p12). Socio-psychological discourse seems to ensure that those displaying 'shades of Blackness' develop thoughts and feelings related to the 'value; social, or otherwise; of an individual's skin colour, and hence the 'value' of themselves as human beings becomes framed in what appears to be 'a negative, fragmented' way (Cross et al, 1991). Further,

there seems to be a very real risk that such negative evaluation may be sustained, and perpetuated, from one generation to the next (Rose, 1997).

Dissociation may, therefore, be reflective of the ways people of colour are able to be-in-the-world, and may therefore be considered a useful is a commodity in any multi-cultural society for people colour, and not indicative of some of the more negative consequences of dissociation such as psychopathology (Graham, 1990; Ross, et al, 1990; Dunn et al, 1994; Carter, 1995). Dissociation may not be truly reflexive of mental illness, but a means of coping with the effects of discrimination.

Possible Consequences of Dissociation within the Therapeutic Relationship Formed During Counselling And Psychotherapy: Some Implications

'Dissociation', like depression, may be seen as a naturally-occurring means of coping with the adverse effects of social experience. Where adversity to skin colour, persists, dissociation, which denies the presence of skin colour, also, persists, and there is a real danger of Black people becoming a 'fragmented people' within the wider society.

If, it argued that Black men are prone to dissociating self identity from their skin colour, and that such dissociation offers some 'protection' from adverse societal response to the presence of that skin colour, then it seems reasonable to assume that this defensive mechanism then be re-enacted in their interactions with counsellors and psychotherapists. Whilst, it is well documented that counselling and psychotherapy are social phenomena which seem to be orientated towards, and hence accessible/available to those who aspire to White, middle class beliefs, attitudes, and values (Smedley, 1993; Carter, 1995, Dupont-Joshua, 1996), Black men may benefit from evaluating their life circumstances, and re-constructing a sense of self that integrates their sense of being with the physical feature of 'Black skin colour'. It is argued that Black men may not share the same sense of reality as those of their prospective counsellors/psychotherapists, and hence may not gain access to such forms of help and support; nor indeed, believe that they would be of benefit (Dryden and Feltham, 1994). Thus the experience of 'citizenship', and the respect that goes with citizenship is, often, denied (Taylor-Gooby, 1991, p172; Kant, 1959, p82).

Throughout much of British social history, people of ethnic origin seem to have been subject to the will, and determination, of the dominant culture in which they live. Their very existence seems to have been constructed out of the chaos, and despair, that still prevails in the minds of the society in which they have chosen to live. Black men, still, seem to make fewer life choices, and access fewer sources of help and support compared with others whose ethnic origin may not be so obvious. Overtime, a constructed sense of self seems to emerge which is, arguably, reflexive of 'an experiencing self' that is, continuously, trying to find new, and different, ways of coping with adversity in its many forms. Societal constraints are prevalent, and particularly pervasive, despite the many different social institutions set up to alleviate the 'pressure', (e.g. Commission for Racial Equality, The Equal Opportunities Act, etc. It be argued that the very existence of social institutions such as 'Blackliners', 'ARP Choices', etc., reinforce the view that Black men; and Black people in general; have needs which are so different from the rest of British society that they can not catered for in main-stream welfare services. How is this?

In the next section, an attempt to explore the experiences of people of colour in counselling and psychotherapy should whether or not such experiences are related to the attitudes, values, and beliefs of those offering such services in the field of counselling and psychotherapy.

Possible Reasons For The Exclusion of Black Men From Counselling And Psychotherapy

Some writers argue that the activities and preoccupations of psychotherapy and counselling and psychotherapy are, often mutually, exclusive to 'White middle class' people (for example, Dryden and Feltham, 1995). This would depend on a working definition of that which constitutes psychotherapy and counselling and psychotherapy, who is actually doing the work of psychotherapy and counselling and psychotherapy, and who controls access and availability to psychotherapy and counselling and psychotherapy.

Such criticisms suggest that therapists and psychotherapists are engaged in activities which are, often unavailable, and inaccessible, to those who do not identify themselves as either being neither 'White' nor 'middle class'. If, we look at what might take place during counselling and psychotherapy, (i.e. a process that facilitates choice, and change; reduces confusion; induces self-respect, and a sense of being valued; where their co-exists a socially, and philosophically, 'empathy', and an acknowledgment of the feelings of others (British Association of Counselling's , 1995; 'Code of Conduct'; fact sheet 10), it could be argued that Black men might benefit from such interaction; albeit, at a therapeutic level. Perhaps, (as suggested by Dupont-Joshua, 1994), some counsellors and psychotherapists have difficulty understanding the social implications that being 'non-White', and living in a society dominated, both socially, and politically, by White people. Perhaps, some counsellors/psychotherapists avoid the subject matter that is presented to them by referring the Black client, elsewhere; or suggesting some form of 'medication'; or may be counsellors/psychotherapists become so overwhelmed with Existential guilt during the therapeutic encounter that they view everything with which the client presents, as a being a consequence of experienced 'Racism'. In doing so, therapists fail to delineate that which may be directly related to misperception, from that which is not (Green, 1993).

Perhaps, some counsellors and psychotherapists become so affected by that which is presented that s/he transfers thoughts and feelings to the client from which s/he feels they must defend themselves; thoughts and feelings that might have otherwise remained - hidden (Jones and Seagull, 1977). An example, from my own experience, might serve to illustrate this point. A young man of mixed race, suddenly, became angry with me during a counselling session, and called me 'a fascist with a big stick'. I could have taken this, personally, and chosen to end the session, but I did not. Primarily, because I did not view myself as 'a fascist with a big stick'; reaction to the client's criticism was avoided. It transpired that my ability to arouse thoughts/feelings in the client reminded him of others in the past, (particularly, his mother), who had had a similar effect on him, (i.e. the experience anger). His perception of them, and interpretation of that which had transpired, was similar to that of others being 'fascists with a big sticks'. Conversely, ignoring the skin colour of the client can have, equally, deleterious consequences in counselling and psychotherapy (Jones and Seagull, 1977).

Other factors such as the cost of counselling and psychotherapy, the cost of making alternative arrangements for child care, and possible communication difficulties (Dupont-Joshua, 1996; Rose, 1997), might further make it difficult for Black men; and people of colour, in general; to benefit from such, ordinarily, useful interaction.

The Importance Of Language

Language, in itself, appears to be purposeful (Searle, 1969; Goffman, 1971). Much of that which is believed to be 'true' about a person's thoughts and feelings seem to be dependent on that individual's ability to use language that has shared meaning for all concerned. In the first instance it is hoped that the listener understands us, our uncertainty as whether or not we are understood seems to give rise to anxiety, which can not be avoided. Again we are forced to discover in other a common language; ways of expressing ourselves, which is as familiar to us, as it, is to others. From birth, the child may be shown to develop language skills in accordance with a seemingly, inherent need to communicate need/desires/wishes. Sensory, and motor skills develop such that language skills tend to improve with use, and life experience (Bates, et al, 1975). Babies may be shown to acquire understanding of the effect on their environment, through the use of voice-tone, inherent in language (Moss, 1967; Wolf, 1969). Even where understanding is largely one based on inferences inherent in the child's vocalisations (Bloom, 1970; Bowerman, 1977), and the child's personality (Lewis Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Damon, 1983, the extent to which individuals use language seems largely dependent on them being given the opportunity to use language. Through the primary, and secondary periods of socialisation the child may be shown to derive meaning from the actions of others, and the process of understanding seems to be facilitated by the appropriate use of language which represents, symbolically, the child's understanding of that which is, or has, taken place (Mead, 1934; Damon, 1983).

'Human language' may be described as being 'unique'. It may consist of unitary words, or a phrase (lexicon), which has meaning in the absence of other words, consist of a number of words, strung together in the correct order (syntax). Both the lexicon, and the syntax, must make sense to the listener (semantics) if that which is communicated is to be understood. The rules of language use must be learned (Chomsky, 1957), and children are encouraged to make full use of the language that prevails in their cultural setting in order to communicate in a way that may be understood by the listener (Vygotsky, 1962). In this way, children learn to reflect on their thoughts, feelings, and experiences; and those of others; and to communicate them, through the symbol use of language (Piaget, 1968). Not only does the child need to learn how to use language, pragmatically, (i.e. to denote the situations, and circumstances in which s/he finds themselves, but the child, also, needs to learn 'how' to differentiate between social settings in which s/he finds themselves making all sorts of assumptions/inferences about the people s/he is attempting to communicate with (Clark and Murphy, 1982; Sperber and Wilson, 1986). The child learns how to develop 'new' ways of behaving depending on his/her understanding of the social settings in which s/he finds themselves, and with whom s/he is communicating (Goffman, 1971; Schlenker, 1980).

Familiarity with the communicative object permits, and facilitates the use of object-specific knowledge the child has already acquired, but in unfamiliar situations, (e.g. the first day at school, or meeting new, or unfamiliar people), the child may feel 'unsure', or 'uncertain' about that with which s/he is communicating (Geertz, 1960). The child may feel experience a certain amount of anxiety, especially where others interpret his/her symbolic use of language, differently (Bruner, 1975). It would seem that human experience is represented symbolically in the cultural use of language. In the absence

of such experience, the need to distinguish between different objects/situations of everyday existence, may limit the number of different verbal labels, and hence the ability to communicate, effectively.

Human thought, arguably, develops in isolation of speech, but communicate thought and feeling beyond gesture, and shrieks requires the development of a suitable vocabulary. These symbols may vary with cultural experience (Carroll, 1956). Vygotsky (1962) argued that the prevailing social situations the in which children find themselves dictated how language might be used, but thought, and language developed independently of each other. It was not until the mental processes governing thought and language became enmeshed that a level of understanding was achieved. Piaget (1968) argued that thinking, and understanding, was dependent on culturally specific symbolic use of language, and that one could not proceed without the concurrent development of the other. Intellectual development then, proceeds where the child having ability to think, reflects upon his/her experiences through the systematic use of language.

People of colour seem to be restricted in the number, and types of communication in which, society allows them to participate in much the same way as 'autistic children', for instance. It has been shown that autistic children tend to avoid social contact (Tinbergen and Tinbergen, 1983), though it is not clear whether this avoidance results from associating the anxiety that may have been aroused from such contact with the real or imagined consequences of such contact; suffice to say that an autistic child's anxiety driven fear of such contact is compounded when others insist that they maintain such contact (Reicher, 1983). This means that language acquisition, and everything that is dependent on the autistic child's ability to communicate, is often inhibited (Rutter, 1983). This may mean that the autistic child fails to cope with social interaction, overtime, and derives meaning by inference, only. Such restrictive social practices may mean that the autistic child becomes, wholly, dependent on visual perception, as opposed to a combination of both visual, and verbal perception (Hobson, 1984), and interpreting such perceptions becomes difficult (Baron-Cohen et al, 1986).

Overall, the use of language is essential for successful social interaction as it provides the means by which the individual is able to make sense of the world-around them (Derrida, 1967). Bearing in mind the context in which verbal communication takes place, lexiconic, syntactic, and semantic rules of language may be used to, symbolically, convey meaning beyond the literal sense without which the individual would be less likely to develop a true sense of self, nor indeed, of others. Similarly, deriving meaning from social interaction in which s/he finds themselves becomes, and remains difficult, beyond that of inference. It is argued that people of colour may experience a similar degree of restricted social interaction for similar reason to that of the Autistic child, and that such restrictions limit the degree to which they might be able to derived meaning about the world around them beyond that of inference. Black men, through societal restrictions, may demonstrate a type of social interaction that reflects an absence of a degree of knowledge and understanding about themselves; about others, and the world, in general; beyond that of inference, and this should be taken into account during therapeutic intercourse.

Given the purported difficulties in communication (Bowler, 1993; Rose, 1997, p92); the absence of help and support (Feltham and Dryden, 1995); the value attributable to 'difference' by Western society as a whole (Dupont-Joshua, 1996); the perpetuated, and reproduced, differences in

average income between Black and White people; a the absence of constructive emphasis on the 'commonalities' that exist between races and cultures (Ward, 1979; Vontress, 1988), it could be argued that mentally-dissociating self from the which consistently limits one's life chances, overtime, seems to be a healthier option.

The difficulties reflected in Black people's experiences within counselling and psychotherapy continue to be commensurate with those experienced in other areas of the British health service (Bhavani, 1986; Williams, 1989; Leathered, 1990). Both staff (Commission for Racial Equality, 1983; Torkington, 1983), and clients (Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1982; Rocheron, 1988; McCalman, 1990; BHAN, 1991; Bowler, 1993) alike continue to be treated, differently. For example, McNaught (1988) in reviewing a number of studies, personal accounts, and tribunal cases, found that racial discrimination was practised in staff selection, staff promotion, and selection for in service training in the NHS. A disproportionate number of nurses of ethnic origin were over represented in the total number of ancillary staff, lower grade nurses, domestic staff, and working unsocial able hours, (e.g. nights, and weekends), in less desirable fields of practice, (e.g. care of the elderly; mental health), and in less prestigious teaching hospitals, compared with their 'White' counterparts. The Kings Fund Equal Opportunities Task Force (1991) suggested that racial inequality within nursing was deep-rooted, and wide-ranging, and were not over confident of its demise in the short-term. Black doctors were, also, found to be disproportionately represented in the less prestigious teaching hospitals, the less popular specialities, (e.g. accident and emergency, geriatrics, and psychiatry), and had similar difficulty gaining access to inservice training, and promotion. It would seem that those controlling accessibility, and availability within the health professions are ensuring that the inequalities perpetuated and reproduced within the wider society, are reflected within the health service. There is no reason to suspect that counselling and psychotherapeutic professions to be any different.

Emotional Distress As A Consequence Of 'Poor' Problem - solving Abilities

The rate at which an individual is able to reason may be indicative of their problem-solving abilities. Adversity, throws-up many situations in which Black people are required evaluate new situations within the context of that which is, already, known about the relationships between various aspects contained within the predicaments in which they may, or may not find themselves. The specific aim is "to arrive at some pre-determined goal, or solution". If, it is assumed that reasoning is purposeful, then it follows that Black people's response in the face of adversity is, also, purposeful, and failure to reach a desired solution is reflexive of an inability to access the 'right' information, or difficulty determining 'how' to go about solving a presenting problem.

Much of that which is known about learning, and problem-solving has been deduced from the analyses of methods people use when solving specific types of problems, (e.g. resolving problems that require some form of transformation) (Simon, 1978). 'Transformational problems' may be 'well-defined', or 'ill-defined', but they all require the individual to transform a given problem from one state, to another, and in doing so reach a possible solution to that problem. Ill-defined problems require much more effort; on the behalf of the problem-solver; because the information required has not been

included in the original problem statement. However, the desired outcome is exactly the same, (i.e. to transform the problem from its original, ill-defined state, to one which renders the problem, solvable, or better defined).

Whether or not the problem is judged 'ill-defined', or not, seems to depend on the amount of abstraction, or generalisation, required (Gick and Holyoak, 1981). A problem statement's underlying structure describes the relationship between the components contained within the problem, and people are said acquire enough information about the possible relationships between the various components of the underlying problem, and hence to solve such problems, through the process of learning (Anderson, 1983). Subsequently, analogies between underlying structures become the means by which new/different problems are evaluated. Where the individual is given the opportunity to identify the underlying structure of similar problems, presented overtime, and reach resolutions, s/he becomes better able at resolving that kind of problem, irrespective of the problem's surface structure Sternberg, 1977; Anderson, 1983).

Analogical Reasoning, and Problem-solving

Making analogies between current experiences, and past experiences facilitates the reasoning process. Aptitude test have been analysed in an attempt to determine the structural components of a presented problem. By studying the sequence of 'moves' an individual makes when the problem when presented to them, enables the researcher to identify the cognitive processes, which might be taking place. Sternberg (1977) has suggested that the sequence of moves observed when solving both isomorphic, (i.e. problem with the different underlying structure), and homomorphic, (i.e. problems with same underlying structure), would be the same irrespective of the underlying structure.

However, other theorists have suggested that some people demonstrate considerable difficulty solving problems by analogy. For Example, Reed et al (1974), and Simon and Hayes (1974) found that subjects presented with problems where the underlying structure was isomorphic demonstrated considerable difficulty resolving subsequent problems unless they were informed that the method for solving such problems was related/associated. Luger and Bauer (1978) showed that where two problems were presented, and their underlying structure was made explicit, there was no difficulty demonstrated by problem-solvers. It was not clear whether or not the problem-solver assumed that the underlying structure of one problem was similar to that of other; and therefore, transferred the method of operationalising one problem, to that of another; or whether the problem-solver had to determine the underlying structure first before attempting to solve the second problem. However, where the subjects were able to visualise an underlying structure of each presented problems, they seemed better able to transfer on method of problem-solving to another, and thus resolve the subsequent problem(s) (Brown and Clement, 1989).

Simon's (1978) information-processing model suggested a way in which of the problem-solver might cognitively evaluate a presented problem. The model seems to set the limits within which the information-processing system works, but say little about how the system goes about solving the problem. Kotovsky (1985) suggests that problem-solvers not only need to know 'how' to go about

solving a presented problem, but they also need to understand the relationship between the various components inherent in the problem's underlying structure. However, Kahneman (1993, p76) suggests that understanding the relationship between the different aspects of problem is not necessary, and that the problem-solver simply needs to remember that there is one, and possesses some knowledge of rules that guide that relationship.

How Problems Might Be Mentally-Represented

Simon (1978) further suggests that the mental representation of a problem often contains more, (or less), information than is required to solve the presented problem. A problem-solver progresses through a series of stages before reaching a point where a resolution becomes imminent. Sternberg (1977) identified six cognitive processes, which may be involved in analogical reasoning. These are encoding, inference, mapping, application, justification, and response. Each problem is thought to proceed through this sequence of cognitive processes before resolution is possible. The problem with this model is the time factor involved, and determining how similar problems may be mapped' onto existing information.

A theory, proposed by Kintsch and Van Dijk (1978), which demonstrates how a problem may be mentally-represented in the long-term memory, whereby, they proposed that memories are constructed by a process of deletion, generalisation, and construction. Memories therefore represent an optimal amount of information pertaining to a particular event, situation, or problem statement thus rendering the experience, meaningful. Information that do not seem particular relevant at the time of inception may be lost. the argument is that at the highest level of abstraction, the problem-solver needs to apply information about a particular problem/situation which may not be given at the time of inception. Arriving at a resolution may require inference based on information/knowledge from other experiences s/he has already encountered (Sternberg, 1986). The task of processing such information which may not share the same underlying structure as that of the given problem statement or situation, and hence, may further add to the time taken for the individual to reach an appropriate resolution (Kovotsky et al, 1985). Gick and Holyoak refer to the optimal level of abstraction but suggest that where the underlying structure of held information is dissimilar, abstraction tends to speculation, and the resolution may not be considered to be more than, at best, an educated guess.

The ACT* Model Of Learning Problem-solving

In, Anderson's model of the ACT* system, it would seem that access to both a declarative, and a procedural memory is necessary for problem resolution. Mediating between these two aspects of the memory is the working memory whose content at any one time determines which other aspect of ACT* system is activated (Anderson, 1983). The procedural memory said to contain the production rules which determines which aspects of the declarative memory are referred to at any one time. The content of both the procedural, and the declarative memory, may be changed to reflect new, and

different experiences. This, in turn, seems to be dependent on the problem-solver's perception of the problem presented.

The production of rules for problem-solving seems to be the 'work' of the working memory. The procedural memory stores the production rules, and therefore, reflects the processes whereby new, and different problems may be solved; assuming that similar problems have been encountered at some time in the past. If, the production rules are equated with strategies for problem-solving; domain-specific, or otherwise; teaching individuals strategies for solving problems should improve their ability to solve such problem in the future (Shoenfeld, 1979; Kotovsky et al, 1985; Alexander et al, 1989). However, some individuals fail to benefit from strategy-based problem-solving, suggesting that problem-solving requires some prior knowledge of the subject matter, (i.e. the content of the declarative memory), and that access to the declarative memory is, somehow, 'blocked' (Goswami and Brown, 1989). Kintsch Van Dijk (1978) have suggested that teaching 'bridging analogies' might help in the process of solving analogous problems; assuming that problem-solving is dependent on deductive, or 'top-down' processes.

Induction versus Deduction

Problem-solving by induction, it is argued, enables individuals to abstract (generalise) from that which is presented; it is a 'bottom-up' approach to problem-solving. In reaching an resolution, the individual is required to make a proportional analogy between the underlying structure of a presented problem, assumedly, inherent, in the information given, and that the underlying structure is in a format which is known, or pre-exists within the declarative memory of Anderson ACT* model of the memory (Reed et al, 1985) The individual needs to assume that there is a degree of resemblance, and test that assumption/hypothesis, accordingly. But the degree of resemblance will be reduced, if, the information that pre-exists is wide-ranging, and/or faulty in some way (Heller, 1979; Brown and Clement, 1989). However, it is unclear as how the individual determines whether the resolution, of a given problem/situation, would be best achieved using an inductive, or deductive process.

It follows that deducing solutions to presented problems will be 'blocked' where the individual is unsure, or uncertain, where the correct domain-specific problem-solving strategy(ies) are either unknown, or where other information provided does not 'match' that which is already known about the presented problem. If, problem-solving is to be purposeful, it would make little sense to apply context-specific knowledge to problems/situations, which do not appear to be related to that which is believed to be 'true' already about the context, or the problem presented. Therefore, it must be argued that 'deductive reasoning' is a consequence of prior 'inductive' processes.

Such factors are important in counselling and psychotherapy where the aim of intervention is to improve the clients problem-solving skills through the process of cognitive reasoning. It may be shown that 'poor' cognitive reasoners loose a lot of time (Whiteley, 1976), and hence, endure much emotional distress where solutions to presenting problems, consistently, elude them. Time lost determining the very structure of the problems presented (Chi et al, 1981), or discerning the meaning of the language used (Heller, 1979), can affect the quality of the counselling/psychotherapeutic interaction. 'Good' cognitive reasoners, on the other hand, spend less time encoding, internally

mapping, and applying the information pertaining to the presented problem/situation, and appear to locate the appropriate relational concepts, faster (Whiteley and Dawis, 1974). Clearly, in well-defined problem statements/situations, the relationship between the information is stated, and therefore, easily, 'mapped' on to that which is, already, known. However, where problems are 'ill-defined', the individual may need to determine what the relationships might be between a presented set of 'objects' before any attempt may be made at solving the problem(s). Blockages to long-term memory (Goswami and Brown, 1989), and 'distorted thinking processes' (Gilbert, 1992, p36) may hinder this process as the individual has access to an even more limited amount of information.

Overall, it has been argued that presented problems, or situations, often, have underlying structures, which may, or may not, be known to the problem-solver. In the counselling session, the underlying structure of problems/situations with which s/he, consistently, seems to have difficulty and appropriately, resolving, may need to be made 'explicit', (and other information), inherent in the context in which the problem/situation occurs, may be need highlighted. Careful use of language when making problems/situations more explicit seems to be important, especially, where attempts are being made to reach an appropriate resolution, and ensuring that similar difficulties are less likely to arise in the future.

One model of psychological understanding, (e.g. Control Theory), attempts to explain human behaviour as a means of controlling the consequences of interacting with an external environment: the world outside (Glasser, 1984). It could be argued that in controlling some aspect of the external world, the individual is, actually, attempting to control the effects of 'being' in that external world. In being aware of emotional distress; of feeling emotional pain; the individual attempts to reduce that experience, (or better still), prevent that experience from occurring in first place by controlling the world around them (Glasser, 1989). An individual may suppress their feelings in the hope that a resolve may occur in the short-term, or attempt to modify/change their external environment. Avoidance, and escape strategies, are included in the latter resolve as the context in which feelings may be expressed changes when a person, purposefully, avoids certain situations; in effect, hides or runs away. Learning 'how' to control one's innermost feelings would seem to be, intricately, woven in the fabric of life, and some individuals seem to be 'more able than others' at doing just this.

An Experiential/Existential Approach To Determine Meaning

Having explored the 'psychological facts' reflective of current beliefs in cognitive psychology, we can now turn our attention to their 'signification' (Sartre, 1939/1962). What do these 'psychological facts' mean in relation to skin colour, and in what context would such meaning apply, the experience of Existential angst is argued to be inevitable (Van Deurzen-Smith, 1997). Simply, being-in-the-world, and exposing ourselves to opposing views and opinions, fills us with anxiety and appears to limit the extent to which we are in relation with the lived-world. However, without such experience we can not define ourselves in relation to others, we can not say with any certainty that which is the same and that which is different, and we can ascribe meaning to that which is not represented in one form or another, symbolically. Hence Existential anxiety, or angst, is an essential component of 'being-in-the-world'.

For people of colour, there is a distinct reminder of a way in which they are overtly, different. They believe that they are in the world, that they are apart of it, and yet somehow detached from it as a result of the meaning attributed to the colour of their skin. The presenting 'difference in perception' must either be upheld, decimated, or avoided to greater or lesser extent. The symbolic representation of skin colour may well be different for different people of colour in different contexts. However, it seems to remain an Existential 'given', that for the experience of Existential angst in relation to the colour of their skin infers the pre-existence of a difference between the symbolic representation of skin colour, and 'what' that skin colour signifies. In short, a difference in perception. So, for example, the Black man who refrains from allowing others to discover those ways in which is vulnerably different, is aware of the many ways in which his skin colour may be represented, symbolically, how this difference may give rise to Existential angst, may therefore, choose to dissociate himself from the meaning attributed to that very aspect of his embodiment.

As a point of reason, if, a person of colour did not share this belief, there would be no basis for the experience of Existential anxiety that arises when presented by that which appears to reinforce this belief, (e.g. 'I don't believe this about myself so its validity is of no consequence'). Similarly, if this belief did not challenge a preferred sense of the self of human person, he would not experience Existential angst, and invoke emotions, which could then transform his whole sense of being-in-the-world. If, what is observed in-relation with those who would discriminate against us, did not grate so violently with a sense of being that is nothing without the opportunity so do, we would not seek to de-value its importance in relation to the 'lived-world', in some way. Therefore, difference between how I perceive myself of being-in-the-world, and how I am perceived as being-in-the-world, will inevitably give rise to anxiety, and a transformation in the self-of-being which is unpredictable.

Skin colour seems to "conjure up" many things to many people depending on the context it shows relevance, but what is the nature of the psychological facts that when related invoke this "apparition". If, it assumed that people of colour are more than the sum of their parts; more than the colour of their skin, how is it that we attached such importance to the presence of this one particular defining feature? At first instance, it would seem that it would be best to keep one's distance from that which threatens, and/or is believed may do us harm. But where does the idea of harm originate? From

where does this important information derive? It is argued that, we as a society, all have a role to play in the derivation of meaning, and selectively choose to believe that which recurs in our everyday experience. Hence, where the sources of our information depict people of colour in ways which may be construed as being threatening, does so with regularity, and fails to balance such representation with other possible ways in which people of colour may be shown to interact with the world symbolic representation will continue to give rise to existential angst.

For some time now, I have wondered how children as young as those observed in Rose's (1997) work, could possibly conclude that there is something about that within which they were embodied that others found objectionable, and this argument seems to provide a possible answer. Children thinking in 'concrete' terms do not seem to internally represent the world in ways, which will allow for abstraction beyond that which they believe to be true in the here-and-now. Symbolic portrayal of people who are physically dissimilar to themselves are often portrayed as being disagreeable, as opposed to those who do not share the similar defining features. Would you align yourself with something that invites confrontation, such that you may actually cease to exist in-relation? I think not. It is more likely that you would seek to aspire to the views and opinions of those who do not invoke feelings fear, and apprehension. (Thomas, 1971: 104)

But herein lies the paradox, how do you "rid yourself" of something that is a part of your physical being? It is argued that children, mentally; and, indeed some adults; dissociate themselves from that which invokes anxiety, and threatens to lower their sense of value and of being-with-the-world. It is only in the mind's eye that such dissociation is possible, and where a person of colour can assume semblance of 'an object', rather than as a person. The distinction between 'I-it', and 'I-thou' has been outlined above (Buber, 1970), but it in separating-out oneself, mentally, in much the same way as when adopting a 'paranoid-schizoid position', as posited within Kleinian 'Object Relations', the individual is able to assume an identity that is 'fragmented', but safer inasmuch as, not-White people are less likely to draw attention to the colour of his skin.

Sartre refers to the individual choosing a 'veil' through which the world is perceived; a veil that protects the 'fragile self' from the hostility of existence. The person of colour having laid witness to the hostility from which he cannot escape, physically, brings down this veil, and in doing so magically transforms the world into a place where anxiety becomes tempered. He "hides his true self from the world", and inhibits the discovery of that which may offend in his mind's eye in anticipation of real, and/or imagined harm. In so doing, he assumes the position of inauthenticity, and operational certainty, thus defending himself from adversity. But here in lies the paradox. He cannot escape the very skin with which he was born. There is no escape. Nor can he avoid interaction with that which will result in experienced angst. He appears to be deluding himself that harm will not come to him when it is, clearly, visible that his skin remains a source of contention for others in as yet undefined contexts. Clearly, this form of defence is not good enough. How else can he defend himself from a hostile world, and in so doing find a way of being-in-the-world that is more reflective of that within which he is embodied?

In counselling people of colour who have difficulty coping with discrimination, it has been found that fundamental to their very existence is the capacity to reject, and ignore. This may be

portrayed as expressions of boredom, or disinterest, or some other rationality. But in saying that 'I feel bored', am I not also saying, 'I find you boring'. In admitting that I find the world disinteresting, am I not, also, saying 'I am disinterested'? I think, more fundamental to this, is the belief that 'the world finds me disinteresting'; 'the world finds me boring': and the existential anxiety that appears invoked in response to this experience the client tends towards depression, and the desire to 'hibernate' (as one of my clients put it). He, effectively, distances himself from the world-around him. 'Existential guilt' implies that the individual believes that he should be able to do something about his anxiety-ridden situation, but did not heed his/her 'call of conscience' (Heidegger, 1927). The client's attempt to hide away from the world around him (Umwelt) served a purpose. It reflected the difficulty he had in facing the world-around-him in the course of his everyday life. He could not find the courage to face adversity, (i.e. discrimination), as he imagined was his everyday experiences (Tillich, 1952). At the same time the paradox prevails as in his hibernation the client was reminded of the world-around him every time he was faced with the prospect of living the relative safety of his home. He was fully aware that his internal conflict was unlikely to change unless he found the courage to face the world anew with every ounce of his being.

Failure to be-in-the-lived-world culminated in what appeared be a 'forcing-of-distance' away from his lived-world. Hence, the client mentioned above, seemed to be on a 'continuum of defence' about which he appeared to move from the polarity of active-aggression, to one of passive-aggression (or hibernation as he put it), for instance. He could not assume responsibility for the way society responded towards him, but He could do something to rectify the he perceived the world-around. He could see the world anew with a new vision: one that saw every discriminating touch, glance, comment, or spoken word, with curiosity. With awareness comes the opportunity to transcend his everyday existence into one where he had previously found unbearable. He could no longer speak with certainty, and in so doing say, 'that art thou, the discriminator'. He could say, 'there appears to be 'the discriminator''; he could feel the anxiety well up inside of him; but he could not say with any certainty, 'there is the accuser', for has not as yet entered into genuine dialogue with s/he that stands accused.

In the face of adversity, he had been given the opportunity to realise his potential, and do something completely unexpected in-relation with others. He could set-aside the products of his imagination in situations where discrimination is unspoken, and speak in a unfamiliar voice that is, essentially, different. By this I do not advocate inauthenticity, but suggest that his speaking in a manner, which belies his frustration, annoyance or anger in-relation with others, he invites others look anew at the person stood before them. He could give up his passion for aggressiveness; for setting at a distance and failing to make present; and nurture his compassion for interrelatedness. He could rejoin humanity as one who suffers, who relishes his suffering, who thrives on adversity purely for the opportunities they afford to him, and who heeds the 'call of his conscience' anew, each and everyday.

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